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POLARIZED JUSTICE? CHANGING PATTERNS OF DECISIONMAKING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
By: Herbert M. Kritzer*

This article examines patterns of increasing partisan polarization
in decisions by federal judges at all three levels of the federal court
system. After an initial section briefly discussing the general issue of
partisan polarization in American politics, the analysis draws on
several extant data sources to present evidence concerning
polarization for each of the three levels of courts. In line with the
general perception, the analysis shows increasing, and significant,
polarization in the behavior of the justices of the Supreme Court
depending on the party of the appointing president. However, dividing
the cases into the categories of civil liberties and rights, criminal, and
economics/regulation, I find no pattern of increased polarization in
the economics/regulation area, despite some prominent decisions
sharply dividing the Court. Much of the change that has occurred
reflects who Presidents have been appointing to the Court.
For the courts of appeals and federal district courts, there is also
evidence of increasing differentiation between appointees of the two
parties’ presidents. Given the more routine nature of cases below the
Supreme Court, the gaps and the change at the lower levels are much
less. Again, the nature of the changes varies with the types of cases
and those changes significantly reflect who is being appointed to the
courts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Starting in the 1960s, American politics has become increasingly
polarized. This polarization is evident for both political elites1 and the
* Marvin J. Sonosky Chair of Law and Public Policy, University of Minnesota
Law School. I would like to thank Robert Carp and Kenneth Manning for making
available the latest version of their extensive dataset on decisions of federal district
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electorate.2 The judiciary has not escaped these developments, 3 as
evident in the conflicts over federal judge’s confirmation. 4 Recent
federal judge’s confirmation conflicts have gone well beyond the
long-standing role played by political partisanship. 5 Polarization plays

judges; Robert Carp responded to numerous questions I had regarding the data. An
earlier iteration of this paper focused specifically on the federal district courts;
Professors Carp and Manning appeared as coauthors of that earlier paper which is
available on SSRN at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007983. I would also like to thank
Regninald Sheehan and Susan Haire for responding to queries about the Court of
Appeals Database. Lawrence Baum kindly made available data he has assembled
on Supreme Court clerks.
1
Political elites include, among others, elected officials, other senior government
officials, party leaders, and prominent journalists and political commentators.
2
See NOLAN MCCARTY, ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY
AND UNEQUAL RICHES (2006); see generally Gary Jacobson, Partisan Polarization
in Presidential Support: The Electoral Connection, 30 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1
(2003); see generally NATHANIEL PERSILY, SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL
POLARIZATION IN AMERICA (2015); Christopher Hare & Keith T. Poole, The
Polarization of Contemporary American Politics, 46 POLITY 411 (2014); see
generally MARC J. HETHERINGTON & THOMAS J. RUDOLPH, WHY WASHINGTON
WON'T WORK: POLARIZATION, POLITICAL TRUST, AND THE GOVERNING CRISIS
(2015); see generally JAMES A. THURBER & ANTOINE YASHINAKA, AMERICAN
GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES, CHARACTER, AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL POLIZATION
(2016); see generally ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE DISAPPEARING CENTER:
ENGAGED CITIZENS, POLARIZATION, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011); see
generally JAMES E. CAMPBELL, POLARIZED: MAKING SENSE OF A DIVIDED
AMERICA (2016).
3
See generally Richard L Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. (forthcoming May 2019) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3132088
[https://perma.cc/SA49-JJB3] (overviewing the research concerning polarization of
the judiciary).
4
See generally NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND
THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS (2005); see generally
BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN
ANGRY TIMES (2006); see generally SARAH BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN,
ADVICE AND DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2009);
see generally AMY STEIGERWALT, BATTLE OVER THE BENCH: SENATORS, INTEREST
GROUPS, AND LOWER COURT CONFIRMATIONS (2010); see generally Salmon A.
Shomade et al., Lower Federal Court Judicial Confirmation Fights: A Critical
Review of the Empirical Literature and Future Research Directions, 47 PS: POL.
SCI & POL. 149 (reviewing the political science literature on conflict over lower
federal court confirmations).
5
See generally HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS
(1972); see generally SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER
COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); see generally
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a role in judicial selection in some states as well, particularly in
changes to selection systems in states such as North Carolina,6
Tennessee,7 and Kansas.8 It is also evident in some ostensibly
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES & PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (3rd ed. 1992).
6
In the early 2000s, North Carolina had switched from partisan to nonpartisan
judicial elections; see generally NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, History of
Reform Effects: North Carolina, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial
_selection/reform_efforts/formal_changes_since_inception.cfm?state=NC
[https://perma.cc/GB56-V7LL] (last visited Feb. 18, 2018). In the 2012 election,
Republicans won control of the legislative and executive branch of government for
the first time since reconstruction, and in the wake of that success moved to
consolidate control of state courts, eventually reverting all state judicial elections
back to the partisan format; see Trip Gabriel, They Couldn’t Beat the Courts, So
They Voted to Change Them, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2017, at A1.
7
In 1971, the Tennessee legislature adopted what was labeled the Tennessee Plan,
a variant of the Missouri plan (AKA “merit selection”), for Tennessee’s appellate
courts; three years later, it returned the Tennessee Supreme Court to partisan
elections, but then reinstated the Tennessee Plan for the Supreme Court in 1994;
see NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, History of Reform Effects: Tennessee,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/formal_changes_
since_inception.cfm?state=TN [https://perma.cc/9GJJ-SMYS] (last visited Feb. 18,
2018). One controversial element of the Tennessee Plan was that it had never been
submitted to the electorate as a constitutional amendment. A challenge to the Plan
based on the absence of an amendment failed in the Tennessee courts; Shriver v.
Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1973). In the 2010 election, Republicans won
control of both the legislative and executive branches of Tennessee government for
the first time since Reconstruction. Proposals were introduced into the legislature
to abolish the Tennessee Plan, and revert to contested elections. Other proposals
were introduced to free the governor from being constrained to appoint someone
nominated by the Selection Commission. Eventually, a proposed amendment was
passed that eliminated the constraint on whom the governor could nominate, with
nominations subject to confirmation of the legislature; judges would continue to
stand for subsequent terms in retention elections; see Margaret L. Behm & Candi
Henry, Judicial Selection in Tennessee: Deciding “the Decider,” 1 BELMONT L.
REV. 143, 166-167 (2014). This action by the legislature came after it had allowed
the legislation authorizing the existing nomination commission to lapse; id. at 145.
8
Kansas was the first state to follow Missouri in adopting a system constraining
the governor with a requirement to choose from a slate nominated by an
independent commission and using retention elections for subsequent terms. This
system was adopted in 1958 for the Kansas Supreme Court, became an option for
district courts in 1972, and was specified in the legislation creating the Court of
Appeals in 1977; see NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, History of Reform
Effects: Kansas, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/reform_efforts/
formal_changes_since_inception.cfm?state=KS [https://perma.cc/2TTH-A7DG]
(last visited Feb. 18, 2018). The Kansas appellate courts came into conflict with
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nonpartisan elections for state supreme court justices, perhaps most
clearly in elections for the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 2008 and
2011.9
the Republican governor, Sam Brownback, and the Republican controlled
legislature. Most of the judges on these courts had been named by Brownback’s
Democratic predecessors. Erik Eckholm, Outraged by Court in Kansas, G.O.P.
Sets Out to Reshape It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2016, at A1 (“Brownback and other
conservative Republicans [had] expressed outrage over … decisions that
overturned death penalty verdicts, blocked anti-abortion laws, and hampered Mr.
Brownback’s efforts to slash taxes and spending,”). Brownback’s goal was to gain
full control of the selection process by eliminating the constraints created by the
mandate to appoint from a list forwarded by a nominating commission. When this
proved impossible to do with simple legislation for the Kansas Supreme Court, the
legislature proceeded to make that change for the Court of Appeals; see Kansas
Governor Signs Bill Changing Court of Appeals Appointments, WICHITA EAGLE
(Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.kansas.com/news/politicsgovernment/article
1112192.html [https://perma.cc/KS5E-ERT3]. It was possible to make the change
for the Court of Appeals because that court is entirely the creation of the
legislature, and there is nothing in the state constitution that constrains how judges
of the court are to be selected and retained. To pass a constitutional amendment
that would make a similar change for the Kansas Supreme Court requires a twothirds majority in the state legislature which Republicans have not been able to
muster; see Daniel Salazar, Kansas Supreme Court Selection Change Dies in
House, WICHITA EAGLE (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.kansas.com/news/politicsgovernment/article58419373.html [https://perma.cc/FGB9-ZKPK].
9
HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS, 8–12 (2015). In the 2008 election, Justice
Louis Butler, the only African American to have served on the Court and who was
standing for election after having been appointed to fill a vacancy by Democratic
governor Jim Doyle, was defeated by trial court judge Michael Gableman, who
received extensive backing from business interests. After the election, the judicial
disciplinary body brought charges that Gableman’s campaign had run
advertisements that violated judicial ethics rules; the Wisconsin Supreme Court
failed to impose discipline when it split 3 to 3. Gableman decided not to run for
reelection when his term expired in 2018; see Patrick Marley, Wisconsin Supreme
Court Justice Michael Gableman Will Not Seek Second Term, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL (June 15, 2017), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/
2017/06/15/supreme-court-justice-michael-gableman-not-seek-second-term
/399554001/ [https://perma.cc/53QL-94QE]. In the April 2011 election, Justice
David Prosser faced challenger longtime assistant state attorney general JoAnne
Kloppenburg. In the February primary, Prosser had won 55 percent of the vote
compared to only 25 percent for Kloppenburg, with two other candidates receiving
the remaining votes. The April election became a proxy battle against the
Republicans who had gained full control of the other two branches in the 2010
election and had started passing legislation aimed at unions serving teachers and
other government employees. Both the 2008 and the 2011 elections produced
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Importantly, the polarization extends beyond judicial selection to
judicial decisions. This polarization is most prominent in the pattern
of decisions by justices of the U.S. Supreme Court,10 particularly in
high visibility cases, such as Bush v. Gore,11 and those involving
issues such as gun control, LGBT rights, affirmative action, and
abortion rights.12 Substantial polarization also exists in decisions of
some state supreme courts.13 As discussed in this article, statistical
analyses of decision patterns on the U.S. Supreme Court,14 the U.S.

voting patterns that strongly correlated recent gubernatorial elections. Specifically,
the correlation between the county-level percentage for governor and the countylevel percentage for supreme court justice, what I label the “partisan correlation,”
was .794 in 2008 and .892 in 2011. The Wisconsin Supreme Court elections in
2016 and 2018 also showed very strong partisan patterns. The partisan correlation
in 2016, in an election between a justice recently appointed by the Republican
governor and a challenger backed by Democrats, was .921, the highest of any
Wisconsin Supreme Court election in the state’s history. In 2018, the open-seat
election for the position being vacated by Michael Gableman, the partisan
correlation with the 2018 gubernatorial election was .917. The correlation between
the election results for the 2018 supreme court election and the 2016 presidential
election was .891, reflecting that the supreme court election became something of a
referendum on Donald Trump’s presidency; see David Weigel, Democrat Wins
Bitter, Costly Race for Wisconsin Supreme Court, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Apr. 3,
2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/midwest/ct-wisconsinsupreme-court-election-20180403-story.html [https://perma.cc/25C4-48NM].
10
See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization
Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, SUP. CT. REV. 301 (2016)
[henceforth, “Split Definitive”]; see generally NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM,
THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME
COURT (2019); Lee Epstein & Eric Posner, Above Politics No More, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2018, at A23.
11
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see generally HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES
THAT COUNTED: HOW THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
(2001); CASS R. SUNSTEIN & RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND
THE SUPREME COURT (2001).
12
See generally THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES
(2014).
13
Michael Wines, Judges Say, Throw Map Out. Lawmakers Say, Judges First,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/14/us/
Pennsylvania-gerrymandering-courts.html [https://perma.cc/33R7-M2W7].
14
See infra notes 92–140, and accompanying text. See James L. Gibson, The
Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 507 (2007) (analyzing the polarization of public views of the U.S. Supreme
Court).
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Courts of Appeals,15 and the federal district courts16 demonstrate that
polarization based on party of the judge or the appointing president
goes beyond the high visibility cases. In this article, I explore in-depth
patterns of increasing differences in decisions by federal judges
depending on the party of the president who appointed them. I find
evidence of increasing differentiation at all three levels of the federal
court system. At all three levels, the presence or degree of polarization
varies by the type of case.
In the next section of this article, I briefly review what we know
in broad terms about polarization in American politics. In the
following sections, I examine partisan differences in decision patterns
at each of the three levels of the federal court system: the U.S.
Supreme Court,17 the U.S. Courts of Appeals,18 and the federal district
courts.19 Each of these sections combines a review of extant literature
related to polarization in decision-making and original analyses
drawing on available datasets of decisions for each of the three court
levels. In looking at polarization, my focus is on the party of the
appointing president rather than the partisan background of the
individual judge.20
A. Data and Methodology
In the sections on each of the three levels of courts, I discuss the
datasets I employ. All three datasets were compiled by political
scientists. One common element among them is the classification of
decisions as “liberal” or “conservative.” How a decision is coded
depends on the nature of the legal issue that is raised. Generally, a
decision favoring a claimant in the civil liberties or civil rights case is
labeled liberal; a decision favoring a criminal defendant in a criminal
case is labeled liberal; and a decision in an economics or regulatory
case is coded liberal if it disfavors a business, either by ruling in favor
of an employee (or a union) or by ruling in favor of the government in

15

See infra notes 144–168, 169–178, and accompanying text.
See infra notes 198–207, and accompanying text.
17
See infra notes 92–141, and accompanying text.
18
See infra notes 179–186, and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 208–225, accompanying text, and the Appendix B.
20
Using the data on decision-making by federal district judges, I will show that the
party of appointing president distinguishes judges more than does the judges’ own
backgrounds (although there is a very high correlation); See infra, note 212, and
accompanying text.
16
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a regulatory matter.21 Coding in this way is not without its problems,
particularly in the civil liberties area. For example, a decision
upholding the right of anti-abortion protestors to congregate near an
abortion facility in a way that may interfere with people seeking to
access the facility would generally be coded as a liberal decision. 22
Coding can also be complicated in cases in which the issue is
ambiguous. For example, one can view Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia,23 a case involving the denial of
university funding to student religious publications while providing
funding for secular publications as involving either a freedom of
speech issue or an Establishment Clause issue; the coding of justices’
decisions in this case as liberal or conservative depends on how the
issue is characterized. There can also be a question of which broad
category a case should be viewed as falling in. For example, the 2018
case concerning the constitutionality of state laws allowing public
worker unions to require non-member employees covered by the
union contract to pay an “agency fee” for the union’s workplacerelated services could be seen as either a labor case or a freedom of
expression case, and the coding of the case depends on whether one
sees it as raising a labor issue or a First Amendment issue.24
I present the analysis of decision patterns largely through graphics
showing the percentage of decisions decided in a liberal direction
(henceforth “percent liberal.”). In a few places, I report a Pearson
product moment correlation to provide a measure of the direction and
strength of the relationship.25 I employ simple linear regression to fit
a straight line to the trend26 and to test whether the slope of that line
(reported as “b”) by estimating the probability that a slope as large or
larger would be observed by chance if the overtime pattern was in fact
random.27

21

Decisions in cases involving some types of issues, such as taxes and intellectual
property, do not necessarily lead to ready categorization as liberal or conservative.
22
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (showing the legal substance of the
decisions by the conservative bloc on the court would be categorized as liberal
with the views of the dissenting liberals as conservative).
23
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819
(1995).
24
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
25
H.M. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 396–403 (Revised 2d ed. 1979).
26
Id. at 382–396.
27
Id. at 415–422.
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II. CONCEPTUALIZATION AND UNDERSTANDING POLARIZATION
Polarization can be evident in either ideology or behavior.
Research on polarization among the citizenry typically focuses on the
degree citizens systematically vary in their views regarding policyrelated issues which presumably reflect ideology. 28 A good example
of research showing increased polarization among the citizenry is a
series of studies by the Pew Research Center, the most recent of which
was published in October 2017. The 2017 Report drew on data Pew
collected over a 23-year period, 1994 through 2017. 29 Across a set
measure of “values” (e.g., view of homosexuality, abortion,
importance of hard work, etc.), the difference between self-identified
Democrats and Republicans in the average percentage taking a
conservative position increased sharply. In 1994, the difference was
15 percentage points; by 2017, it had increased to 36 percentage
points. In contrast, there was little change in the gap based on race,
age, gender, education, or religious attendance. 30 Figure 1 is taken
from the Pew Report and shows a hollowing out of the center, with
increasingly consistent conservative and liberal positions,31 and
decreasing overlap between those identifying with each of the
parties.32 Pew also found growing political hostility. In 2017, 44 to 45
percent of Democrats and Republicans had “unfavorable” opinions of
the other party compared to 20 percent in 1994,33 a pattern that has
been labeled “affective polarization.”34

28

The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Oct. 2017) http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/
5/2017/10/05162647/10-05-2017-Political-landscape-release.pdf. [https://
perma.cc/2RBL-RNPG].
29
Id. at 1.
30
Id. at 3 (Respondents who said that they “leaned” toward one of the parties were
included with those who described themselves as a Republican or a Democrat.);
See also id. at 7 (providing a list of these 10 values).
31
Id. at 11. The figure is reprinted here under the terms of the Pew Research
Center’s “Terms of Use,” dated May 5, 2018 http://www.pewresearch.org/termsand-conditions/ [https://perma.cc/5SXQ-KGTP] (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).
32
Id. at 12–13.
33
Id. at 5, 65–68.
34
See generally Jon C. Rogowski & Joseph L. Sutherland, How Ideology Fuels
Affective Polarization, 38 POL. BEHAV. 485 (2016).
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Figure 1: Polarization in the American Electorate, 1994-2017

A second indicator of the increasing partisan polarization of the
electorate is the increasing correlation between partisan identification
and policy preferences. Political scientists measure party identification
along a seven-point scale ranging from “strong Democrat” to “strong
Republican.”35 Using data from the American National Election
Studies (ANES), Abramowitz and Saunders examined the relationship
between responses regarding four policy issues asked about on all of
the quadrennial studies between 1972 and 2004: aid to blacks,
abortion, health insurance, and jobs/living standards. 36 They averaged
the correlation across three elections: 1972-1980, 1984-1992, and
1996-2004.37 For the first period, the overall average was .18 (.24
excluding abortion), .25 (.31 excluding abortion) for the second
period, and .33 (.38 excluding abortion) for the third period. 38 They
also looked at the correlation between party identification and self-

35

See generally CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER 121–125 (1960); the
intermediate points are “Democrat,” “Independent, leaning Democrat,”
“Independent [leaning neither Democrat or Republican],” “Independent, leaning
Republican,” and “Republican”.
36
Alan I. Abramowitz & Kyle L. Saunders, Is Polarization a Myth? 70 J. POL. 542,
547 (2008).
37
Id. at 547.
38
Id.
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placement on a seven-point ideology scale and found that it had
increased from about .32 in 1972 to over .60 in 2004. 39
Cavari and Freedman applied the same method using data from
the quadrennial ANES studies between 1984 and 2012. 40 They looked
at six policy issues, the four considered by Abramowitz and Saunders,
plus overall government spending and defense spending. 41 For the first
three of the presidential election years, the correlation between party
identification and preferences regarding five of those policies, the
exception being legalization of abortion, was steady, averaging .21. 42
For the three presidential election years between 1996 and 2004, the
correlation for the same five increased, averaging between .38 and
.42.43 The correlation between party identification and preferences
regarding abortion was close to zero in 1984 and 1988 but then started
to increase, and by 1996, it was only slightly below the correlations
for the other five policies.44 After 2004, the correlations for all six
policies increased, both in 2008 when the average for the six was .58
and 2012 when it rose to .67;45 however, in 2016, the average
correlation dropped substantially to .51.46 It is important to note that
Cavari and Freedman go on to present analyses suggesting that at least
some of the apparent increase in polarization among the public may
be an artifact of declining response rates for public opinion surveys. 47
Studies of elites employ several approaches to assess ideological
differences in attitudes and/or behavior. Some studies rely on surveys
of elite preferences to provide a measure of ideology.48 For federal

39

Id. at 546.
Amnon Cavari & Guy Freedman, Polarized Mass or Polarized Few? Assessing
the Parallel Rise of Survey Nonresponse and Measures of Polarization, 80 J. POL.
719 (2018).
41
Id. at 721.
42
Id. at 720.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. (The averages reported above were computed by the author using the
correlations generously provided by Amnon Cavari) (citing an email to Herbert
Kritzer, April 2, 2018).
46
The figures for 2016 were provided by Amnon Cavari (email to Herbert Kritzer,
April 12, 2018). The correlations dropped for all policy areas; they ranged from .49
to .53, compared to a range of .63 to .70 for 2012.
47
Cavari & Freedman, supra note 40, at 721–23.
48
See generally Jeane Kirkpatrick, Representation in the American National
Conventions: The Case of 1972, 5 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 265 (1975); See generally
40
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judges, some researchers have employed measures based on
information from the appointment process, such as newspaper
commentary49 or the ideology of key actors in the appointment and/or
election process.50 A third common approach is to infer political elites’
ideology from their behavior by either relying on interest group
ratings51 or using various types of scaling techniques based on
decision/voting information for members of Congress, 52 for the
justices of the U.S. Supreme Court,53 and for state supreme court
justices.54 A recently developed approach relies on information
regarding patterns of campaign contributions to measure ideology of
state supreme court justices,55 although this type of measure is limited
to the years that comprehensive campaign finance reports have been
available and to persons who have made political contributions. The
indicator of elite polarization I use here is differences in decisions
based on either explicit or implicit party affiliation. 56
In congressional rollcall voting, polarization is evident in the very
sharp difference in voting by Republican and Democratic members.
Allen H. Barton, Consensus and Conflict among American Leaders, 38 PUBLIC
OPINION Q. 507 (1974).
49
See generally, Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989).
50
Micheal W. Giles, et al., Alternative Measures of Preferences for Judges of the
Courts of Appeal (1998) (Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Assosciation, Chicago) (on file with Emory University); Paul Brace, et al.,
Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387 (2000).
51
Herbert M. Kritzer, Ideology and American Political Elites, 42 PUB. OPINION Q.
484 (1978); Glenn Sussman & Byron W. Daynes, The Impact of Political Ideology
on Congressional Support for Presidential Policy Making Authority: The Case of
the Fast Track, 22 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 141 (1995); Bernard Grofman, et al.,
Is the Senate More Liberal than the House? Another Look, 16 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 281
(1991).
52
See generally DUNCAN MACRAE, DIMENSIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL VOTING
(1958); Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, A Spacial Model for Lgislative Roll
Call Analysis, 29 AM. J. POL. SCI. 357 (1985).
53
See generally, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point
Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 19531999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
54
See generally, Jason H. Windett, et al., Estimating Dynamic Ideal Points for
State Supreme Courts, 23 POL. ANALYSIS 461 (2015).
55
See generally, Adam Bonica & Michael J. Woodruff, A Common-Space
Measure of State Supreme Court Ideology, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 472 (2015).
56
For appointed elites, such as many judges, the party of the appointer serves as an
implicit indicator of affiliation in the absence of an explicit indicator.

320

K AN . J.L. & P UB . P OL ’ Y

Vol. XXVIII

Although there has long been a partisan difference in that voting
pattern,57 in the past it was common to find overlap such that some of
the more liberal Republicans were more liberal in their roll call voting
pattern than were the more conservative Democrats. Although much
of this overlap reflected conservative Democrats from the South, one
could also find conservative non-southern Democrats such as Senator
Frank Lausche from Ohio (1957-1969) and liberal Republicans such
as Senators Charles McC. Mathias from Maryland (1969-1987),
Clifford Case from New Jersey (1955-79), and Lowell Weicker from
Connecticut (1971-89), and Representatives such as Charles Whalen,
Jr. from Ohio (1967-1979) and Pete McCloskey from California
(1973-75). In the words of one scholar, “[t]he days of Rockefeller
Republicans challenging Goldwater Republicans are over, as are the
days of the Dixiecrat Democrats doing battle with northern liberal
Democrats.”58
Over the last several decades, the difference between
congressional Democrats and Republicans has sharpened to the point
that there is little overlap between them in their roll call voting
patterns, either as measured by interest group ratings or indices, such
as Poole and Rosenthal’s D-W Nominate scores, that are based on a
sophisticated scaling methodology.59 An examination of D-W
Nominate scores for the 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 111th, 112th, and 113th (196974 and 2009-14) Congresses reveals no overlap at all for either
chamber during the later period compared to substantial overlap
during the earlier period.60 Moreover, analyses show that, although
Democrats in Congress have moved in a leftward direction since the
1960s, Republicans have generally moved much more sharply in a

57

See generally JULIUS TURNER & JR. EDWARD V. SCHNEIER, PARTY AND
CONSTITUENCY: PRESSURES ON CONGRESS (1970); MACRAE, supra note 52; see
generally Gary W. Cox & Keith T. Poole, On Measuring Prtisanship in Roll-Call
Voting: The U.S. House of Representations, 1877–1999, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 477
(2002).
58
CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 24.
59
Christopher Hare & Keith T Poole, supra note 2, at 424; KEITH T. POOLE &
HOWARD ROSENTHAL, IDEOLOGY & CONGRESS 316 (2007).
60
CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 25.
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rightward direction.61 These changes are illustrated in Figure 2,
created by Ian McDonald.62
Figure 2: Polarization in Voting in the U.S. House of
Representation as Measured by the First Dimension DWNominate Scores

Note: Prepared by Ian McDonald, accessed at
http://rpubs.com/ianrmcdonald/293069;
used with permission. Based on data available at
voteview.com.
Stonecash et al. looked at average ratings for members of the
House of Representatives by the liberal Americans for Democratic

61
The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW,
https://legacy.voteview.com/political_polarization_2014.htm (last updated Mar.
21, 2015) [https://perma.cc/99L5-PSTJ]; see also THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J.
ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 51
(2012) (explaining that there have been other periods of very substantial
polarization in Congress, such as around the beginning of the 21st century); see
David A. Bateman et al., A House Divided? Roll Calls, Polarization, and Policy
Differences in the U.S. House, 1877–2011, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 698, 700 (2016).
62
Ian McDonald (@ianrmcdonald), TWITTER (Jul. 21 2017, 1:33 PM), https://
twitter.com/ianrmcdonald/status/888497304663056385 [https://perma.cc/
ATW9-EA5R] (showing that DW-NOMINATE scores are scaled so that liberal
positions align with negative values and conservative with positive; hence,
conservative appears on the left of Figure 1 and liberal on the right).
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Action for the period 1948 through 200063 and found that the gap
between Democrats and Republicans narrowed from 1960 through
about 1978, but then steadily increased. 64 I obtained the ADA data for
the period 1947 through 2016. The solid lines in Figure 3 show plots
of the mean ADA (liberalism) scores for the House and the Senate. I
used the lowess smoothing procedure65 to produce the long-dashed
line. The divergence of the two parties’ representatives and senators
since 1960 is clear in the figure. The short-dashed lines show the
degree of polarization.
Figure 3: Congressional ADA Scores, 1947-2016
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These lines represent the 25th percentile (first quartile) for the
Democrats and the 75th percentile for the Republicans. Through the
1970s, these two lines overlapped from time to time; since then,
those two lines have diverged, typically deviating little from their
63
JEFFREY M. STONECASH, ET AL., DIVERGING PARTIES: SOCIAL CHANGE,
REALIGNMENT, AND PARTY POLARIZATION 8 (2003); see also CAMPBELL, supra
note 2, at 27.
64
STONECASH, ET AL., supra note 63, at 8.
65
William S. Cleveland, Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smoothing
Scatterplots, 74 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 829, 829 (1979).
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respective means. Unlike with the DW-Nominate scores, the two
parties diverged similarly. 66
Scores from the American Conservative Union (ACU),67 which
started annual ratings in 1971,68 show substantial overlap of the parties
in the early years but a disappearance in recent years. ACU scores
members of Congress so that high values (maximum 100) are
conservative and low values (minimum 0) are liberal. 69 In 1971, five
Republicans received scores of 0 and 28 Democrats received scores of
100.70 Ten years later, no Republicans received a score of 0 and only
four Democrats received scores of 100. 71 By 1981, no Democrats were
receiving perfect scores from ACU and no Republicans were receiving
zeros.72 The most recent ratings, for 2016, show the most conservative
Democrat receiving a score of 27; three Republicans receiving scores
of 0, but they were all running for President and missed a large number
of votes which did not count toward their scores. 73
At the state level, there is variation regarding increasing
polarization in terms of an increasing gap between Democratic and
Republican legislators. According to one analysis, covering the period
1996 to 2013, about half the states were more polarized than Congress,
but some states had only modest gaps between the two parties. 74 In
most states the gap was relatively stable.75 Still, a small number of
states, most prominently California and Colorado, had a sharp increase
in the partisan gap over the period of the study; other states with an
increasing gap, although less sharp, included Arizona, Idaho,
Minnesota, Tennessee, and Texas. 76 Part of the reason for the variation
66

See CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 185.
Federal Legislative Ratings, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE UNION, http://
acuratings.conservative.org/acu-federal-legislative-ratings/ (last visited Feb. 14,
2018).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
See CAMPBELL, supra note 2, at 185.
74
See Boris Shor, How U.S. State Legislatures Are Polarized and Getting More
Polarized, THE WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/01/14/how-u-s-state-legislatures-are-polarizedand-getting-more-polarized-in-2-graphs/?utm_term=.d0268deb28ac [https://perma.
cc/BBN5-LZMG].
75
Id.
76
Id.
67
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may be the relative importance of national policies in matters coming
before a state legislature.77
III. POLARIZATION IN SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING
As noted in the introduction, it is easy to point to prominent cases
in which the justices of the Supreme Court divided along partisan
lines. More importantly, the evidence of polarization measured
quantitatively is just as clear. The ideological screening of potential
court nominees has certainly become more systematic, particularly on
the Republican side with a central role now played by the Federalist
Society,78 and this probably means that presidents are unlikely today
to be surprised by the decision inclinations of their appointees. That
is, it is unlikely that we will see a repeat of a Republican president
appointing a justice such as John Paul Stevens or David Souter. At the
same time, it is possible that under pressure from a Senate not of the
president’s party, a president will nominate someone who would be a
moderate; some argue that this is what President Obama attempted to
do with his nomination of Merrick Garland––that the Senate
Republicans blocked.79 Also, although much of the discussion of
unanticipated decision patterns has focused on Republican appointees
who turned out to be more liberal than their appointer might have
preferred, there are examples cutting in the other direction. Byron
White proved to be considerably to the right of the other KennedyJohnson appointees.80 Before that, one has appointees of Franklin
Roosevelt (Felix Frankfurter, and Robert Jackson) and appointees of
77

See Alex Garlick, National Policies, Agendas, and Polarization in American
State Legislatures: 2011 to 2014, 45 AM. POL. RES. 939 (2017); For a broad
analysis of factors that might account for variation in legislative polarization, see
State Legislative Policymaking in an Age of Polarization, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES 2 (2017), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/About
_State_Legislatures/Partisanshipf04web.pdf (broadly analyzing factors that might
account for variations in legislative polarization).
78
See SCHERER, supra note 4, at 109–10; LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL,
ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 52–55 (2005);
STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 156–61 (2008); MICHAEL AVERY & DANIELLE
MCLAUGHLIN, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY: HOW CONSERVATIVES TOOK THE LAW
BACK FROM LIBERALS 25–27, 30–35 (2013).
79
Devins & Baum, supra note 10, at 334–35.
80
Epstein & Posner, supra note 10.
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Harry Truman (Fred Vinson, Tom Clark, and Sherman Minton), at
least regarding some types of issues. 81
A. Clerk Selection
One decisional indicator of the ideological preference of justices
is in whom they choose as law clerks. Ditslear and Baum assembled
data regarding the Justices’ law clerks to assess whether there had been
any change in the pattern of clerk selection.82 They applied several
analytic methods to examine this question. The most straightforward
approach was to compare the proportions of clerks who had previously
served with a Democratic-appointed appellate judge across four time
intervals (1975-80, 1981-85, 1986-92, and 1993-98). 83 The proportion
of sitting circuit judges appointed by Democrats varied between 57.7
percent and 32.3 percent across the intervals, but one can look at the
difference in the average percentages during each period for
Democratic-appointed justices and for Republican-appointed justices
to get a sense of increasing polarization based on appointing
president.84 For the first three intervals, the differences are modest:
10.7, 10.6, and 4.9; for the fourth interval, the difference jumps to
26.7.85 Importantly, this polarization does not align with the party of
the appointing president because for the last interval two Republican
appointees, Justices Souter and Stevens, have the highest percentage
of clerks who had served Democratic-appointed judges, and the three
highest in the second to last interval were also Republican appointees
81

See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 569–72 (6th ed. 2015); see also infra figs. 11 & 12.
82

See generally Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law Clerks and
Polarization in the US Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869, (2001); see generally Adam
Bonica et al., Measuring Judicial Ideology Using Law Clerk Hiring, 19 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 129 (2017); see also Adam Bonica et al., The Political Ideologies of
Law Clerks, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 96 (2017) (discussing an alternate approach
to measuring Supreme Court ideology using law clerk information (i.e., the pattern
of political donations made by law clerks)).
83
Ditslear & Baum, supra note 82, at 880.
84
The authors computed the difference between the proportion selected by each
justice and the average proportion of Democratic appointees for the time interval.
These baseline figures were 48.1, 57.7, 39.0, and 32.3. The authors compute a
mean without taking absolute values; I recomputed the means based on the
absolute values. When I recomputed these based on absolute values, the mean
drops slightly from the first to second time interval (13.9 to 10.7) but then
increases sharply to 24.5 in the third interval and 31.3 in the last interval.
85
Ditslear & Baum, supra note 82, at 880 (my computation).
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(Brennan, Stevens, and Blackmun).86 Clearly, to the degree that clerk
selection is an indicator of polarization, it need not, at least in the past,
be tied to the party of the appointing president.
A later article by Baum looked at the pattern of Supreme Court
clerk selection for the period 2010-2014.87 The degree of polarization
had, by then, sharply increased. The difference between the four
Democratic-appointed justices and the five Republican-appointed
justices was 59.9 percentage points.88 For the former, an average of
67.9 percent of their clerks had clerked for Democratic-appointed
circuit judges; their individual percentages ranged from 63.2 (Justice
Breyer) to 70.0 (Justices Sotomayor and Kagan). 89 The average for the
Republican-appointed justices was 8.0; their individual percentages
ranged from 0 (Justices Scalia and Alito) to 20.0 (Justice Kennedy). 90
Baum generously provided me with the data he assembled on
clerk selection for the years 1999 through 2009. Using those data and
the figures in the articles, I produced Figure 4. This figure shows some
clear shifts. Democratic-appointed justices have held steady in
selecting about two-thirds of their clerks from applicants who
previously worked with a Democratic-appointed Court of Appeals
judge, dropping a bit below that level only in two periods. In the first
three periods shown in Figure 4, the clerk selection pattern for
Republican-appointed justices tracked the pattern for Democraticappointed justices, falling 5 to 10 percentage points lower. As the
figure shows, the two groups of justices start to sharply diverge in the
mid-1990s. Democratic-appointed justices continue to select about
two-thirds of their clerks from candidates who had served a
Democratic-appointed appellate judge. Republican-appointees
sharply shifted their selections to candidates who had served
Republican-appointed appellate judges.

86

Id.
See generally Lawrence Baum, Hiring Supreme Court Law Clerks: Probing the
Ideological Linkage between Judges and Justices, 98 MARQUETTE L. REV. 333
(2014); Devins & Baum, supra note 10, at 356 (providing the percentage of law
clerks who had previously served with a Republican-appointed lower court judge
for hires during the 2004 through 2016 terms; the percentages ranged from a high
of 97.9 percent for Thomas (just barely beating out Scalia at 97.7) to a low of 23.4
percent for Ginsburg).
88
Baum, supra note 87, at 338–39.
89
Id.
90
Id.
87
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Figure 4: Supreme Court Clerk Selection

One could posit two extreme versions of clerk selection. At one
end, justices might select clerks entirely without regard to who had
appointed the appellate judge with whom the candidate had served. In
that situation, one would expect the pattern for clerk selection to vary
over time reflecting the composition of the appellate bench but not
vary depending on the party of the president appointing the justice.
That might have been approximately true for the first two periods,
based on information reported by Ditslear and Baum, but it ceased to
be true by the third period.91 Alternatively, one might posit that
justices generally tend to select clerks with service in appellate court
chambers of judges appointed by presidents of the same party as the
president who appointed the justice, arguably to increase the
likelihood of ideological compatibility between the justice and the
clerk. That appears to be increasingly true of Republican-appointee
justices; Democratic-appointed justices have, over the entire period,
been more likely to choose in that way, but they have not gone as far
along this path as have appointees of Republicans in recent years. A
third possibility, which is difficult to assess, is that justices choose
clerks with experience in appellate chambers where the judge’s
decision pattern is ideologically similar to the justice’s. Data to assess
91

Ditslear & Baum, supra note 82, at 880.

328

K AN . J.L. & P UB . P OL ’ Y

Vol. XXVIII

this more than anecdotally are not available, but it does seem to be
consistent with the patterns of individual justices.
B. Prior Research on Supreme Court Decision Patterns
Until recently, analyses explicitly examining polarization on the
Supreme Court in terms of decisions in cases did not focus on the gap
in decision patterns by appointees of Democrats and appointees of
Republicans, nor did they emphasize the behavior of the justices.
Clark developed and presented measures of polarization based on
methods pioneered by Esteban and Ray.92 The core of Esteban and
Ray measure is a “linear representation of the distance between all
individuals.”93 Clark computed the Esteban and Ray measure based on
two indicators of judicial ideology,94 the Segal-Cover (SC) scores95
and the Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores. 96 Although the latter is
based on the justices’ votes, scholars have treated the JCS scores as a
measure of ideology.97 Using the measures based on JCS, he showed
variation between 1953 and 2004, but not a clear pattern of increased
polarization over the entire period.98 Using the SC scores, his measure
shows a jump in polarization around 1970, but then a return to the
level during the early 1990s.99
Gooch took the measures discussed by Clark, plus others, and
modeled change over time.100 He defined time in two ways: by Chief
92

See generally Tom S. Clark, Measuring Ideological Polarization on the United
States Supreme Court, 62 POL. RES. Q. 146 (2009); see generally Joan Esteban &
Debraj Ray, On the Measurement of Polarization, 62 ECONOMETRICA 819 (1994).
93
Clark, supra note 92, at 149.
94
Id. 152; see Corey Rayburn Young, Judged by the Company You Keep: An
Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of
Appeals, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1133, 1144–1153 (2010).
95
See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989). (These
scores are based on editorial comment during the time between a justice’s
nomination and his or her confirmation by the Senate.).
96
See Martin & Quinn, supra note 53.
97
See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Jeffrey A. Segal,
Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How
Important, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007).
98
Clark, supra note 92, at 152.
99
Id.
100
See generally Donald Michael Gooch, Ideological Polarization on the Supreme
Court: Trends in the Court’s Institutional Environment and Across Regimes, 19372008, 43 AM. POL. RES. 999 (2015).
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Justice and by pre and post Roe v. Wade.101 His analysis used data back
to the Hughes Court.102 He found a “strong linear trend of increasing
ideological polarization on the Court over chief justice regimes and
the pre-Roe to post-Roe jurisprudential regimes.” 103 He also found a
significant correlation between polarization on the Court and Senate
polarization.104
Two recent analyses focus on polarization in the decisions of the
individual justices. In a brief op-ed piece in the New York Times,
Epstein and Posner provided a graph of the annual pattern of voting
by appointees of Democratic and Republican presidents in cases
decided by a 5-4 or 5-3 vote between 1953 and 2017.105 It showed that
differentiation sharply increased in the 1990s, with the percent liberal
by appointees of Democrats on the order of 75 percent or more
compared to 40 percent or less for appointees of Republicans. 106 In the
2017 term, the gap was 74 percentage points: 88 percent liberal for the
Democrats and 14 percent for the Republicans. 107
Devins and Baum explored the patterns of polarization on the
Supreme Court.108 They employed two measures of polarization
focused on the percent of conservative votes cast by justices
differentiated by the party of the appointing president.109 The first was
the standard deviation of the percent of conservative decisions for each
justice, with the justices separated by the party of the appointing
president.110 The standard deviation is a measure of variation and the
idea of using it as an indicator of polarization is that variation among
justices appointed by presidents of one party should decrease as the
Court became more polarized. For this measure, they looked at four
periods of varying length starting in 1986 and continuing to 2015.111
They showed that the standard deviation dropped sharply between
1986-1993 and 1994-2004 for Democratic-appointed Justices; the
standard deviation for Republican appointees did not drop until the
101

Id. at 1001 (analyzing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
Id. at 1016.
103
Id. at 1032.
104
Id.
105
Epstein & Posner, supra note 10.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Split Definitive, supra note 10, at 317–19.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 317–18.
111
Id. at 318–19.
102
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last period they examined, 2010-2015.112 The high standard deviation
for Democratic-appointed Justices in the 1986-1993 period reflected
that the only such justices during that period were the very liberal
Thurgood Marshall and the relatively conservative (for the time)
Byron White; the standard deviation dropped when White retired and
was replaced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg. The standard deviation for
Republicans stayed high until both John Paul Stevens and David
Souter retired during the Obama administration, with the former
replaced by Elena Kagan and the latter by Sonia Sotomayor.
Devins and Baum’s second indicator of polarization is the
difference in the percentage of conservative votes between
Democratic-appointed and Republican-appointed Justices. 113 For this
analysis, they looked at three periods: 1953-1993, 1994-2009, and
2010-2015.114 The gap between the two groups was about 10
percentage points for the first period, rose to about 16 for the second
period, and then to 20 percentage points for the last period. 115 Note
that these figures were based on all decisions, both unanimous and
nonunanimous.116
C. Additional Analyses
To assess partisan-based polarization in the decision patterns of
Supreme Court justices in more detail, I conducted analyses using two
data sources, the Supreme Court Database 117 and the Judicial Common
Space scores.
1. Analyses Using the Supreme Court Database
The Supreme Court Database (SCDB) contains data on decisions
back to the first decision in 1791.118 There are two broad versions
available. 119The “Modern” version extends back only to the 1946
term of the Vinson Court, continuing, as this is written, through the

112

Id. at 319.
Id. at 320.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
E-mail from Lawrence Baum, Professor of Political Science, Ohio State
University, to author (July 28, 2018) (on file with author).
117
Index, The Supreme Ct. Database, WASH. U. L., http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php
[https://perma.cc/CS3J-LFCW].
118
Id.
119
Id.
113
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2017 term.120 It offers several ways of defining units of analysis:
Supreme Court citation, Supreme Court docket number, and legal
issue (“issue/legal provision”).121 The “Legacy” version of the SCDB
extends to 1791, but only allows analyses based on the Supreme Court
citation. For the core analysis, I used the “Modern” version with the
unit of analysis being the legal issue. I chose to use the legal issue as
the unit of analysis because it is not unusual for a Justice’s vote to
differ in its ideological direction across issues within a case. Between
the 1946 and 2017 terms, the Court decided 13,453 issues involving
8,893 cases defined as a court citation; using issue as the basis of
analysis, the dataset contains 119,838 justice votes. 122 Coders
categorized as most votes as either liberal or conservative as described
previously.123 Some votes, 6,703 (5.6. percent), could not be
categorized as liberal or conservative, leaving 113,135 votes for
analysis. Across this set of votes, 52.6 were in the liberal direction,
59.8 percent for appointees of Democrats, and 47.2 percent for
appointees of Republicans. These percentages go down slightly (to
58.8 percent) for appointees of Democrats if unanimous decisions are
excluded; the decrease is greater (to 43.0 percent) for appointees of
Republicans. In Appendix A, I replicate and extend the analyses
shown in the main body of the paper using the legacy version of the
dataset. Appendix A discusses the characteristics of the legacy
version. The results differ minimally, but using that version allows
some consideration of decision patterns in the 1930s and the first half
of the 1940s.

120

See Analysis Specification- Modern Data (1946-2017), The Supreme Ct.
Database, WASH. U. LAW, http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php [https://perma.cc
/2KAK-W7ZD].
121
Id.
122
See Modern Database, The Supreme Ct. Database, WASH. U. LAW,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php [https://perma.cc/PY3B-7U6U].
123
See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Harold Spaeth et al.,
Supreme Court Database Code Book, WASH. U. L. (Oct. 17, 2018) http://
scdb.wustl.edu/_brickFiles/2018_02/SCDB_2018_02_codebook.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K7W3-BKGY].
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Percent Liberal

Figure 5: Liberalism by Party of Appointing President and
Natural Court, 1946-2017 Terms
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Figure 5 shows the pattern of liberal voting for each natural court
for appointees of Democrats and appointees of Republicans. 124 Using
natural courts as the time unit rather than term provides more stability,
given the larger number of cases that tend to be covered by a natural
court compared to the number of each term. It is also, in some sense,
the natural unit if one is interested in how patterns shift as the
membership on the Court changes. The top panel shows the pattern for
all cases and the bottom pattern for nonunanimous cases only. The
growing gap is evident in both figures. Across all cases, appointees of
Republicans have moved more consistently in a conservative
direction; appointees of Democrats have, over time, moved in both
directions, although starting with the Rehnquist Court, they have
moved more in the liberal direction. Looking only at nonunanimous
cases, appointees of both parties’ presidents have moved consistently
in opposite directions, liberal for Democrats and conservative for
Republicans. Figure 6 shows the size of the partisan gap, both for all
votes and for votes excluding unanimous decisions.125 Although there
is a lot of year-to-year variation, the trend in the difference between
the two groups of justices is one of a growing gap. The gap increases
from under 10 percent during the early periods of the Warren Court to
about 20 percent for all decisions and 40 percent for nonunanimous
decisions in the most recent periods of the Roberts Court. That
difference reflects, by definition, that there is no gap in decisions in
unanimous cases.126
One potential issue is that the types of cases being decided by the
Supreme Court have changed since the Vinson Court era. 127
124

See infra fig. 5; Natural Court, The Supreme Ct. Database, WASH. U. LAW,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=naturalCourt [https://perma.cc/
SS4L-VVVR] (“A natural court is a period during which no personnel change
occurs.”).
125
Although the Modern SCDB includes the Vinson Court, all justices serving on
that court were appointed by either Franklin Roosevelt or Harry Truman; hence,
Figure 5 starts with the Warren Court.
126
A plot of the direction of unanimous decisions over the 33 natural courts shows
increasing liberalism starting with the Warren Court (peaking at about 80 percent
of unanimous decisions in the liberal direction. That starts to taper off during the
last two natural courts of the Warren era. Liberalism then declines until the middle
of the Rehnquist Court; since then the percentage of unanimous decisions in the
liberal direction has been relatively stable, averaging 48 percent over the last eight
natural courts.
127
See RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S AGENDA: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
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Figure 6: Voting Gaps in Supreme Court Justices Decisions, 19542017 Terms
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passim (1991); see also DREW NOBLE LANIER, OF TIME AND JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR:
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AGENDA-SETTING AND DECISION-MAKING,
1888-1997 (2003); see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 96–102; Marcus E.
Hendershot et al., The Brethren as Baristas: Percolation and Spillover Within the
U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda 10 (Apr. 10, 2011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1766850 [https://perma.cc/9DKC-87BN] (follow
“Download This Paper”).
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Figure 7: Changing Agenda of the Supreme Court
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Figure 7 shows the proportion of cases for each of three broad
categories—criminal,
civil
liberties/civil
rights,
and
economic/regulation (including
labor and employment)—by natural court. Although there is
substantial variation from natural
court to natural court, the broad trend is a decline in
economics/regulation and an increase in civil liberties/civil rights and
possibly criminal matters. At least some of the changing gap shown in
Figures 4 and 5 may reflect differences in decision patterns depending
on type of case.
Figure 8 shows the percent liberal by party of appointing president
separately for each of the three broad issue areas, both for all cases
and for nonunanimous cases only. The gaps between appointees of
Democrats and appointees of Republicans are summarized in Figure
9. Very clearly the changes in the gap between appointees of the two
parties is coming in cases other than those involving economics and
regulation, and that is true both for all cases and for nonunanimous
cases only. There is at most a minimal gap for cases involving
economic and regulatory issues. The patterns for the other two issue
areas are very similar, both regarding liberalism and the size of the
gap.
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Figure 8: Liberalism by Party of Appointing President, Natural
Court, and Issue Area
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Figure 8 (continued)
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Figure 9: Voting Gaps in Supreme Court Justices Decisions by
Broad Issue Areas
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2. Analyses Using Judicial Common Space Scores
The Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores, which Clark used, 128
are also known as the Martin-Quinn scores. They are based on a
sophisticated scaling methodology similar to that used to derive D-W
Nominate scores for members of Congress. 129 These scores are
derived from the justices’ decisions during each term and provide a
term-specific measure for each justice. Although the scaling technique
is agnostic regarding ideology, in practice, negative values indicate a
liberal pattern and positive values a conservative pattern; for
consistency with other results reported in this article, I reversed the
JCS values so that high values indicate a liberal pattern. One limitation
is that the available scores are not disaggregated by case type. Scores
are available for court terms going back to 1937.
Figure 10 shows the average of the reversed JCS scores separately
for appointees of Democrats and appointees of Republicans for each
term starting with 1937 and continuing through the 2017 term.
Appointees of Democrats shifted sharply in a liberal direction through
the years of the Warren Court; as will be clear below, this reflects
personnel changes on the Court. There is then a slight tendency to shift
back in the conservative direction until the middle of the Rehnquist
Court period before resumption of a pattern of increasing liberalism.130
Note that this regression is not intended to fully model the decision
patterns, but is used here simply to assess whether the pattern could
have been generated through a simple random process 131 and to
measure the magnitude of the trend. For Republicans, the figure shows
a steady trend in the conservative direction. Simple regression
confirms the pattern, showing a .008 annual decrease over the entire
time period;132 if the analysis is limited to terms starting with 1953 (to
128

See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.
See Martin & Quinn, supra note 53, at 135.
130
A simple regression using term to predict reversed JCS score over the entire
period shown in Figure 10 shows slightly more than a .01 annual increase (b=.012,
t=3.11, p=.003) in liberal decisions by the appointees of Democrats. I did not do a
regression analysis for the simple liberal voting measure shown in Figures 5 and 7
because the unit of time was natural court which varies in actual length.
131
A simple random process might involve creating two sets of tiles, one set
showing each year and the other showing the percent liberal for each year, placing
the two sets of tiles in two boxes, and then randomly drawing a tile for each box
and matching them to create an observation.
132
b=-.008, t=-3.57, two-tailed p=.001.
129
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avoid the gap shown in the figure and match the loess line), the annual
decrease doubles to .017.133
Figure 10: JCS Scores by Party of Appointing President, 19372017 Terms
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Figure 11 summarizes the gap in those averages between the two
sets of appointees. As noted previously, no comparisons are available
for the Vinson Court because all justices on the Court during that
period were appointed by either Roosevelt or Truman. Because of this
gap, the figure includes two smoothed lines, one over the entire period
and one starting with the Warren Court. As the figure shows, there
have been periods when the gap between appointees of Democrats and
Republicans was increasing sharply and periods of reasonable
stability. The two periods of an increasing gap were during the Warren
Court and during the Roberts Court. The former reflects, in significant
part, the conservative nature of Truman’s appointees which effectively
depressed the gap at the beginning of the Warren Court. 134

133
134

b=-.017, t=-7.16, two-tailed p<.001.
All four of Truman’s appointees fall on the conservative side of the JCS scale.
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Figure 11: Gap in Averaged JCS Scores, 1937-2017 Terms
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In fact, as shown in Figure 12, the appointees of three of the four
Democratic presidents prior to Lyndon Johnson had average JCS
scores on the conservative side.135 Starting with Johnson, the only
president whose appointee(s) averaged opposite what one might
predict was Gerald Ford, whose only appointee was John Paul
Stevens. Also, the last appointee whose record ran against the
appointer’s likely preference was David Souter (mean reversed JCS
score +0.78), but the first Bush’s average is still strongly conservative
because his other appointee, Clarence Thomas, is the most
conservative (mean reversed JCS score -3.52) of any of the 45 justices
who served on the Court any time between 1937 and 2017. 136

135

The reason that Kennedy shows up on the conservative side is that Arthur
Goldberg, who had a strongly liberal record (see the second bar for Kennedy in
Figure 12), was on the Court for less than three years (Johnson appointed Goldberg
ambassador to the United Nations, and replace him with Abe Fortas); Byron
White, Kennedy first appointment who had a moderately conservative record,
served on the Court for 31 years.
136
Plots using the percent liberal rather than JCS are consistent with what is shown
in Figure 12 and 13.

342

K AN . J.L. & P UB . P OL ’ Y

Vol. XXVIII

Figure 12: Average JCS Scores by Appointing President, 19372017 Terms
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The three measures of partisan polarization in decisions by
Supreme Court justices do not provide entirely consistent results over
the entire period examined. However, they are consistent in showing
that over the last decade or so, there has been an increasing gap
between appointees of Democrats and appointees of Republicans. As
Figure 13 shows, that increase reflects the success presidents––
starting with Ronald Reagan––have had in predicting the decision
patterns of their appointees. The only “disappointment” for those five
presidents would have been David Souter. For Democratic presidents,
the last “disappointment” was Kennedy’s appointee Byron White.
Some small portion of the change over time shown in the figures
represent shifts by individual judges.137 However, with only one or
two exceptions, the magnitude of those within-Justice changes are
small compared to changes reflecting who was appointed to the Court.

137

See Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801, 806 (1998); see also Lee Epstein et
al., Ideological Drift among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How
Important? 101 NW. L. REV. 1483, 1528–29 (2007).
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Figure 13: Average Reversed JCS Scores by Justice, 1937-2017
Terms
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Summary: Supreme Court
There is little surprising in the analyses presented above showing that
the decision patterns on the Supreme Court reflect increasing polarization
of the justices. The one result that may be surprising is the relative
absence of polarization in economic/regulation cases, although one can
certainly point to individual cases where such polarization is evident. 138
Presidents starting with Johnson have, with one exception, succeeded in
appointing justices whose ideological decision pattern is consistent with
the president’s own presumed ideological preference. The polarization on
the Court mostly reflects the departure from the Court of Justices whose
decision pattern failed to conform to the President’s presume expectation.
One question is to what degree the polarization will increase with
President Trump’s appointment. Early indications are that Justice
Gorsuch has planted himself to the far right of the Court, perhaps even to
138

See, e.g., Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619–20 (2018) (finding
that the Federal Arbitration Act trumps (no pun intended) the National Labor
Relations Act, even though the NLRA was passed after the FAA, by a 5-4 decision
with a conservative majority).
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the right of the Justice Scalia whom he succeeded. The departure of
Justice Kennedy, who had been the median justice since Justice
O’Connor’s departure, is likely to further polarize the Court in the wake
of the confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh.
IV. POLARIZATION IN DECISION-MAKING BY JUDGES OF THE U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals decides most cases in three-judge panels,
with the vast majority of them unanimous. 139 Almost certainly, a major
reason for the high degree of unanimity is that a significant fraction of
appeals do not raise difficult issues of law or fact. Many of the appeals
may be last-ditch efforts to avoid undesirable outcomes.140 In some
cases, even a low chance of success is worth the cost of an appeal if a
successful appeal will avoid a very unfavorable outcome. 141 The high
likelihood of unanimity serves to depress the observed differences
between Democratic-appointed judges and Republican-appointed
judges. For this reason, early quantitative research on decisions by
Court of Appeals judges focused on nonunanimous decisions. 142 That
research did find statistically significant differences in decisions in
economics and labor cases based on the judge’s partisan background
but found no statistically discernible differences in criminal or civil
liberties cases.143 Has that situation changed over time?

139

DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS 11, 105–07 (2000); see also Sheldon Goldman, Voting
Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
491, 493 (1975).
140
For an analysis of the decisions to file an appeal in civil cases, see SCOTT
BARCLAY, AN APPEALING ACT: WHY PEOPLE APPEAL IN CIVIL CASES (1999).
141
Some appeals may be initiated more as a bargaining strategy to induce a
settlement that would be a better outcome than the decision being appealed rather
than there being any significant expectation of success if the appeal reaches a
decision.
142
Sheldon Goldman, Backgrounds, Attitudes and the Voting Behavior of Judges:
A Comment on Joel Grossman's Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions, 31 J.
OF POL. 214, 217–20 (1969) (defining “nonunanimous” to include decisions in
which the Court of Appeals overturned a decision of a district court).
143
Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals,
1961–1964, 60 AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N. 374, 380–81 (1966).
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A. Prior Research Regarding Partisan Differences in the Court of
Appeals
Several studies speak to whether there are increasing differences
in the decisions of judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals based on the
judge’s own partisan background or the party of the appointing
president. These studies employ one of two major datasets of decisions
of the Court of Appeals. The first is a publicly available dataset created
by Donald Songer and his students.144 Songer based the original
version of the dataset on a random sample of cases drawn from each
circuit for each year for the period 1925-1988, producing a total
sample of 15,315 cases.145 Songer and his students subsequently
completed extensions to the dataset, the first added cases through
1996, and the second added cases through 2002. 146 This dataset has
been used extensively by Songer, his students, and others. 147 The
second is a dataset created by Sunstein et al., focusing on the period
1995 to 2004 148 That dataset consists of 6,408 published decisions by
144

SONGER ET AL., supra note 139, at xiii–xviii.
See Donald R. Songer, Documentation for Phase 1, THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS DATA BASE, 3–9 (Oct. 21, 2008), http://nebula.wsimg.com/
69ed1f8ecc35094d9de4d2d76147f753?AccessKeyId=96203964AD4677DE3481&
disposition=0&alloworigin=1 [https://perma.cc/7G5C-MC7T] (detailing that for
the period 1925 to 1960, 15 cases were randomly drawn from each circuit; starting
in 1961, the sample for each circuit was increased to 30 cases. “The universe of
cases for each circuit/year was defined as all decisions reported with opinions
published in the Federal Reporter for a given circuit in a single calendar year. To
be counted as a published opinion the decision must announce a disposition of the
case (e.g., affirmed, remanded, dismissed) and must state at least one reason for the
decision. If a decision met these criteria, it was included in the universe of cases to
be coded regardless of the form of the decision.”).
146
Id.
147
See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS
22 (2007) (reporting a decisional ideology score for presidential cohorts from
Truman through Bush, scored such that an average of 3.0 would be perfect
liberalism and 1.0 would be perfect conservatism. Averaging by the party of the
president produces 1.88 for appointees of four Democrats and 1.70 for the
appointees of the four Republicans. More important for my purposes is that the
means combining Democratic and Republican cohorts through Carter (i.e.,
including Eisenhower and Nixon appointees), the mean is 1.85 compared to a
mean of 1.60 combining Reagan and Bush appointees).
148
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 18, 163 n.26 (2006) (exact period varies somewhat
when it was “necessary to produce a sufficient number of cases in a particular
category”).
145
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three-judge panels, covering a wide range of case types, 149 with cases
for inclusion identified through Lexis searches or by shepardizing
prominent cases.150
Songer et al., reported differences in voting by the appellate
judges by the judges’ own party background for the three broad
categories of civil rights/civil liberties, criminal, and labor and
economic regulation, across five unequal length periods ending with
1970-88.151 In the two earliest periods, 1925-36 and 1937-45, they
found that the percent liberal for Republican judges was actually
higher than was the percent liberal for Democrats in the civil
rights/civil liberties and criminal categories, although in the later of
these two periods, the gap was only 0.1 (4.3 and 3.9 for the earliest
periods).152 Only in labor and economic cases was the liberal
percentage consistently higher for Democrats than for Republicans. 153
In the later three periods, Democrats were more liberal in their
decisions than Republicans by 2.6 to 11.3 percentage points with most
of the differences falling in the range 4.9 to 6.6.154 There was no
consistent pattern of increase over time.155 For the most recent period
included in their table, the differences ranged from 5.5 to 6.4
percentage points.156
A strict comparison between Songer et al.’s results and Sunstein
et al.’s results is not possible. First, the former’s results were based on
the party of the judge while the latter were based on the party of the
appointing president.157 Second, Songer et al. drew a random sample

149

Id. at 17–18 (total of 24 distinct case types).
Id. at 156–63, 157 n.5. It appears that authors included all cases found through
their searches that met at their inclusions criteria. They limited their search for
criminal appeals, other than death penalty cases, to a subset of circuits, presumable
as a means of limiting the number of cases.
151
SONGER ET AL., supra note 139, at 115–17. The authors do provide a table
showing percent liberal for each period by presidential cohort, but this table does
not provide enough information to derive summary figures by party of appointing
president for each period.
152
Id. at 115.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
The percent of appointees for which the party of the President and the
appointee’s own party coincide is very high. For presidents Roosevelt through
Reagan, this percentage ranges from 82.1 percent for Carter to 96.2 percent for
150
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of cases without regard to the kind of issue, while Sunstein et al.
selected cases falling into specific issue areas. Third, Songer et al.
included en banc decisions158 while Sunstein et al. limited their
analysis to cases decided by three-judge panels.159 Nonetheless, a
comparison is useful given that Sunstein et al. examined a later period.
Although Songer et al. did not provide overall figures combining issue
areas, for their latest period, 1970-88, the three areas of civil
rights/civil liberties, criminal, and labor and economic regulation, had
similar gaps between Democratic judges and Republican, 5.5 to 6.4
percentage points, as noted previously. 160 For the 1995 to 2004 period
covered by Sunstein et al., the gap between appointees of Democrats
and appointees of Republicans across all of their categories was 12
percentage points.161 They reported gaps for 23 individual issue areas,
and showed that there was substantial variation.162 The largest gap was
40 percentage points for LGBT rights cases with the second largest at
28 percentage points for affirmative action cases. 163 Cases dealing
with punitive damages fell at the other end of the spectrum, with no
difference; several other issues—criminal appeals (other than capital
punishment), takings, and federalism—had gaps of less than five
percentage points.164 When I averaged the gaps for issues falling into
the three broad categories reported by Songer et al., there was no
difference, with all of them falling at about 14 percentage points.165
Clearly, to the degree that it is appropriate to extend the inquiry using
Sunstein et al.’s analysis, the gap between appointees of Democrats
and appointees of Republicans appears to have increased.
Reagan. For all but two, Carter and Truman, the percentage is between 93.0
percent and 96.2 percent. See GOLDMAN, supra note 5, at 355.
158
This is not explicitly stated, but I assume it is the case because the public
version of SONGER, ET AL.’s, dataset that I analyze below. See discussion infra Part
IV.B (including en banc decisions).
159
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 148, at 17.
160
SONGER ET AL., supra note 139, at 115.
161
SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 148, at 19–21.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
One might ask why this figure is less than the 12 percent overall. First, it does
not weight by number of cases in each category, which ranged from a low of 22 for
LGBT rights, to 1,387 for criminal appeals. Second, there is one category of cases,
Commerce Clause matters, that is missing from the table. Third, some issue
categories did not fit clearly into one of the broad categories, and most of those had
small gaps. See id.
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There is a second way to examine the possibility of polarization
on the Court of Appeals: the effect of panel composition. A body of
research on the Court of Appeals in recent years considered the effect
of panel composition, in terms of both partisan background 166 and
demographics, such as race167 or gender.168 The relevant question here
is whether the panel effects related to the partisan composition of the
panel have changed over time. Kastellec used Songer’s Court of
Appeals Database to examine this question over the period 1961
through 2002.169 He grouped the data into five-year intervals, except
for the last two periods, where he used a four-year interval (1996-99)
and a three-year interval (2000-02).170 He found that the difference in
decision patterns for all Democratic-appointed panels compared to all
Republican-appointed panels increased overtime. 171 For most of the
periods prior to the mid-1980s, the gap between all Republicanappointed panels and all Democratic-appointed panels was modest,
averaging six percentage points;172 the gap grew over the last four
periods, 14 percentage points for 1986-1990 and 1991-1995, 22
percentage points for 1996-1999,173 and then reaching 24 percentage
points for the final period.174 Looking at split panels, Kastellec found
the presence of an Republican-appointed judge on a majority
166

SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 148, at 19–24; Frank B. Cross & Emerson H.
Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on
the Federal Court of Appeals, 107 YALE L. J. 2155, 2168 (1998).
167
Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of
Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 299, 325–26 (2004); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial
Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 167 (2013).
168
Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54
AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 389 (2010); Farhang & Wawro, supra note 167, at 299, 325–
26; Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A
Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 320 (2004).
169
Jonathan P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Voting on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals Over Time, 64 POL. RES. Q. 377, 380–84 (2011) (the analysis excludes
cases decided en banc).
170
Id. at 383–85.
171
Id.
172
Jonathan Kastellec, Panel Composition and Voting on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals Over Time, POL. RES. Q. app. at 9 (2011), http://www.princeton.edu/
~jkastell/Panel_Effects_Over_Time/kastellec_web_appendix.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8BTN-9B3P].
173
Id.
174
Id.; Kastellec, supra note 169, at 385 (giving figures that would make the
difference only 23 percentage points).
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Democratic-appointed panel had a moderating effect in the later
periods, but he found no similar moderating effect of the presence of
an Democratic-appointed judge on a majority Republican-appointed
panel.175
B. Analysis of the Updated Songer Dataset
The availability of Songer’s dataset, along with an update through
2002, makes it possible to extend the published analyses based on that
dataset.176 I merged those data with information on the judges’
background, including party of the appointing president and the
judge’s own party.177
Figure 14: Liberal Decision Propensity, U.S. Court of Appeals,
1925-2002
50

20
15
10
5

40

0
35

Gap

Percent Liberal

45

-5
-10

30
19251936

-15
19371945

19461960

Appointees of Democrats

175

19611969

19701988

19891996

Appointees of Republicans

19972002
Gap

Kastellec, supra note 169, at 387.
U.S. Appeals Court Database, JUDICIAL RESEARCH INITIATIVE AT UNIVERSITY
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm
[https://perma.cc/CJL8-JQP3]. The data for the period 1997 through 2002 was
prepared by Ashlyn K. Kuersten and Susan B. Haire. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 148; see also supra text accompanying note 148 (explaining details on the
dataset).
177
Attributes of U.S. Federal Judges Database, JUDICIAL RESEARCH INITIATIVE AT
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA, http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes
.htm [https://perma.cc/C7EN-SAAD]. These data were compiled by Gary Zuk,
Deborah J. Barrow, and Gerard S. Gryski.
176
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Figure 14 shows the percent liberal by party of the appointing
president for the five time periods reported by Songer et al. (1925-46,
1937-45. 1946-90, 1961-69, and 1970-88), plus the two last periods
for which data are available, (1989-96 and 1997-2002). 178 It also
shows, using the righthand axis, the difference between the two groups
of judges in the percent of liberal decisions (“Gap”). 179 Interestingly,
for one of the time periods, 1937-1945, there was virtually no
difference in the liberalism in the decisions of appointees of the two
parties’ presidents. In all the other periods, appointees of Democrats
were more likely to make liberal decisions than were appointees of
Republicans. For most periods, the gap is around five to six percentage
points. For the two most recent periods, the gap grows to almost 11
percentage points. It is unfortunate that data are not currently available
to bring the series forward another 10 to 15 years.
As is true with the U.S. Supreme Court, the types of cases the U.S.
Court of Appeals decides have changed over time. 180 In fact, as Figure
15 shows, the changes at the Court of Appeals have been much more
dramatic than at the Supreme Court. Over the period covered in
the figure, civil liberties/civil rights cases went from a negligible share
of the docket (under 2 percent) to about a quarter in the last period
shown. Criminal cases went from 15 percent to over 30 percent for the
periods starting in 1961. Concomitantly, economics-related cases
dropped from over 84 percent to just under 40 percent. Given this
significant change, it is paramount to consider the three broad issue
areas separately.

178
I was unable to precisely replicate the figures reported by Songer et al., supra
note 139, at 115. Exactly why that is the case is unclear, although the differences
most likely reflect updates and corrections to the original version of the data.
179
I have not included a lowess line in the figure because of the small number of
data points; for the same reason, I did not estimate a simple regression.
180
See SONGER ET AL., supra note 139, at 54–56.
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Figure 15: Changing Agenda of the U.S. Court of Appeals
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Figure 16 replicates Figure 14 separately for the three areas. The
likelihood of a liberal decision clearly varies by issue area. For
criminal cases, it ranges between 21.0 and 29.4 for appointees of
Democrats and 15.5 and 22.8 for appointees of Republicans. For civil
liberties/civil rights, the range for appointees of Democrats is 33.8 to
48.8, if one omits the first period (when it was 17.4, but based on only
23 observations) and, for appointees of Republicans, the range is 29.3
to 32.2, if one omits the second period (when it was 14.0 based on only
24 observations). Liberal decisions were most likely in the
economics/regulation area: 45.3 to 55.0 for appointees of Democrats
and 41.0 to 55.4 for appointees of Republicans.
Turning to the gaps, when assessing whether there is evidence of
increasing polarization, some caution is necessary in interpreting the
apparent differences in liberal propensity. The number of observations
is, for some comparisons, very small and some of those differences
may reflect nothing more than sampling variation. For example, in two
periods, appointees of Democrats appear to have been less likely to
render a liberal decision in a civil liberties/civil rights case than
appointees of Republicans. However, the number of observations were
small: 23 by appointees of Democrats and 53 by appointees of
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Republicans in 1925-36; the comparable figures for 1946-1960 are
176 and 89. Neither of these differences meets the standard threshold
of statistical significance.181 In fact, only two of the six comparisons
for the first three periods meet the threshold of statistical
significance: economics/regulation for 1925-1936 and civil
liberties/civil rights for 1937-1945. For the five later periods, all but
two comparisons of the liberalism propensity of appointees of
Democrats versus appointees of Republicans achieve statistical
significance.182

181
Difference of proportions tests: Z=-1.346 (one-tailed p=.089) for 1925-1936;
Z=-1.342 (one-tailed p=.090) for 1946-1960. There is also a de minimis difference
(less than one percentage point) in the “wrong” direction for economics/regulation
for the period 1937-1945.
182
Both are in the category civil liberties/civil rights for 1946–1960 and 1961–
1969.
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Figure 16: Liberal Decision Propensity by Area of Law, U.S.
Court of Appeals, 1925-2002
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For the most recent period, the difference between appointees of
Democrats and appointees of Republicans in liberal propensity is
similar for the three areas, 9.4 percentage points for
economics/regulation cases, 11.0 percentage points for civil
liberties/civil rights cases, and 12.0 percentage points for criminal
cases. For both criminal cases and economics/regulation cases, this
represents an increase of roughly 5 percentage points from the
immediately prior period. Neither change can be attributed to
chance.183 The difference for civil liberties cases has been relatively
stable over the last two periods: 10.1 percentage points and 11.0
percentage points. None of the specific comparisons of the gap for
civil liberties/civil rights achieves statistical significance, but that gap
has grown steadily over the last four periods, starting at 3.7 percentage
points for the 1961-1969 period. One can conclude that there has been
an increasing difference between the decision patterns of appointees
of Democrats compared to appointees of Republicans. However, the
size of the gap is much more modest than the Supreme Court.
As was true for the Supreme Court, the increasing conservatism
of Republicans on the Court of Appeals is largely a function of who
presidents are appointing. Figure 17 shows the average percent liberal
by appointing President. There has been relatively little change across
Democratic appointers since Truman. In contrast, since Nixon,
Republicans have made increasingly conservative appointments. It is
likely that most of the shifts in decision patterns by judges of the Court
of Appeals shown in the prior figures reflects personnel changes;
whether and how much of the shifts over time reflects changes by
sitting judges is not clear.

183

This is based on tests of the differences of differences of proportions. See
BLALOCK, supra note 25, at 234–36. The two tests produce the following results:
Z=2.415 (one-tailed p=.008) and Z=1.693 (one-tailed p=.045).
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Figure 17: Court of Appeals: Average Percent Liberal by
Appointing President
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C. Summary: Court of Appeals
In summary, based on both prior research and the analysis
presented here, through the early 2000s, there was an increasing gap
between the decision patterns of appointees of Democrats and
appointees of Republicans sitting on the U.S. Court of Appeals. In
broad terms, both for the three issue areas and all cases taken together,
the gap between appointees of the two parties was, by that time,
approximately ten percentage points. This is roughly half the gap
observed for Supreme Court decisions for most of the natural courts
during the Roberts era.184 Unfortunately, data are not currently
available to ascertain whether the gap continued to widen or has
remained stable since the mid-2000s.

184

See supra notes 128–29; see also supra text accompanying notes 128–29.
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V. POLARIZATION IN DECISION-MAKING BY FEDERAL DISTRICT
JUDGES
Decisions at both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals levels
are usually accompanied by a written explanation for the decision.185
In contrast, most decisions by district court judges do not produce
written explanations that can be coded as is done with the opinions of
the appellate courts. One result is that there is much less research on
decisions of the federal district courts. The research that has been done
is largely based on the subset of district court decisions that are
accompanied by a written opinion,186 even though it is also clear that
published decisions are not representative of all decisions made by
federal district judges.187 At least one study has shown that when
unpublished decisions are included in the analysis the party
differences may disappear.188 Nonetheless, the discussion that follows
relies on published decisions by federal district court judges.
A. Prior Research
Research on published decisions by federal district judges shows,
at least since the 1960s, measurable differences in the direction of
published decisions rendered by federal district judges depending on
the judges’ own partisan backgrounds 189 and/or on the party of the
185
Exceptions at the Supreme Court level occur in decisions when the vote among
the justices is tied due to a vacancy or recusal, when a case is dismissed as
improvidently granted, and when a pending case is reversed and/or remanded in
light of a decision the Court has recently made.
186
One exception to this would be the study of criminal sentencing by federal
judges. See Beverly Blair Cook, Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft
Cases—1972, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 597, 597 (1973). See also Herbert M. Kritzer,
Political Correlates of the Behavior of Federal District Judges: A “Best Case”
Analysis, 40 J. POL. 25, 26 (1978).
187
Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A
Research Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782, 782 (1992); Peter Siegelman & John J.
Donohue, III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and
Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1133,
1133 (1990).
188
Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 259 (1995). A study of
sentencing of draft resisters during the Vietnam War also failed to find statistically
discernible differences in sentence severity between appointees Democrats and
Republicans. See Kritzer, supra note 186, at 44, 52.
189
ROBERT A. CARP & C. K. ROWLAND, POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 6 (1983); C. K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP,
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appointing president.190 The size of these differences varies with issue
area but are often modest,191 and there may be specific areas for which
the judge’s party background fails to predict the direction of the
judge’s decision.192
There is one analysis focused specifically on polarization in
decision-making by federal district court judges. Sennewald et al.
employed a dataset constructed by Carp and Manning covering
roughly half of the district court decisions published in the Federal
Supplement over an approximately 85-year period.193 The dataset
identifies the president who appointed the judge, the judge’s party (if
it could be identified), the type of case (area of law),194 and the
direction of the decision (liberal or conservative) coded in the same
way as are decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.195
The dataset omits cases in areas of law in which decisions lack a clear
political direction: patents, admiralty, tax, bankruptcy appeals, and
land condemnation; it also excludes common law claims based on
state law that would have been brought under the court’s diversity
jurisdiction, including most tort, contract, property, and family law

POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1996); C. K. Rowland
& Robert A. Carp, A Longitudinal Study of Party Effects on Federal District Court
Policy Propensities, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 291, 291 (1980).
190
Robert A. Carp et al., A First Term Assessment: The Ideology of Barack
Obama's District Court Appointees, 97 JUDICATURE 128, 136 (2013); Robert A.
Carp et al., The Voting Behavior of Judges Appointed by President Bush, 76
JUDICATURE 298, 298 (1993).
191
PETER CHARLES HOFFER ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS: AN ESSENTIAL
HISTORY 278–79 (2016).
192
Barbara M. Yarnold, Factors Related to Outcomes in Religious Freedoms
Cases, Federal District Courts: 1970–1990, 19 JUST. SYS. J. 181, 181 (1997);
CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 148, at 47 (finding judges’ party
backgrounds may not predict the direction of the judges’ decisions in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, at least for the period they studied from 1995–2004).
193
Marc A. Sennewald et al., The Polarization of the Judiciary, 23 PARTY POL.
657, 659 (2017).
194
The “type of case” code employed 31 categories. See the Appendix for a list of
these categories along with the number of cases in each, both for 20-year periods
and overall, as well as an analysis based on the specific codes.
195
See supra notes 20–23; see also supra text accompanying notes 20–23. Other
information coded includes the Federal Supplement citation, judge identifier, the
month and year of the decision, the federal district and circuit, the judge’s year of
appointment, and the judge’s race and gender.

358

K AN . J.L. & P UB . P OL ’ Y

Vol. XXVIII

cases.196 Otherwise, the dataset includes all cases meeting inclusion
criteria; unlike the Court of Appeals Database, it is not based on a
random sample of decisions.197
The authors calculated annual liberalism scores separately for
judges identified as Democrats and judges identified as
Republicans,198 and then split the data into two periods: 1934 to 1966
and 1967 to 2008. In the earlier period, they found a 2.6 percentage
point difference (44.1 versus 41.5) in the percentage of liberal
decisions by Democratic judges compared to Republican judges. 199 In
the later period, the gap increased to 10.2 percentage points (46.8
percent for Democrats versus 36.6 for Republicans).200 Omitting cases
categorized as civil liberties as a way of controlling for the sharp
increase over time in the role of those cases in the dataset, the early
period gap was about the same as for all cases (2.3 percentage points)
but the later gap was smaller (7.6 percentage points).201 Sennewald et
al. also looked at Presidential cohorts and found little difference
between judges appointed by Truman and Eisenhower but clear
differences between the Johnson and Nixon appointees. 202
B. Analysis of District Court Decisions
The Carp and Manning dataset has been made available for others
to analyze,203 and that allows me to move beyond the results reported
by Sennewald et al. As was the case regarding both the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals, my goal is descriptive. I seek to identify an
increasing gap between the decision pattern of Democratic-appointed
196

Professor Carp personally coded most cases in the dataset. Students coded a
small subset under his supervision.
197
See Robert A. Carp & Kenneth L. Manning, Carp-Manning U.S. District
Court Database, U. MASS. DARTMOUTH: COLLEGE OF ARTS & SCIENCES,
http://districtcourtdatabase.org/ [https://perma.cc/FV7A-PJE6]. See also Robert A.
Carp & Kenneth L. Manning, Announcing the Archival of the Carp-Manning U.S.
District Court Database, 25 L. & CTS. 4, Spring 2015, at 4, 4–5, http://lawcourts
.org/pubs/newsletter/spring15.pdf [https://perma.cc/G62X-9V93].
198
Sennewald et al., supra note 193, at 659 (noting decisions by judges whose
party background could not be identified were excluded from their analysis).
199
Id. at 660.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 661.
203
Robert A. Carp & Kenneth L. Manning, Carp-Manning U.S. District Court
Database, U. MASS. DARTMOUTH: COLLEGE OF ARTS & SCIENCES, http://district
courtdatabase.org/ [https://perma.cc/FV7A-PJE6].

2019

KRITZER: POLARIZED JUSTICE

359

judges and the decision pattern of Republican-appointed judges
appointed and whether any such gap varies depending on the type of
legal issue involved. As with the analysis of Supreme Court decisionmaking, I do not seek to model either decision-making by federal
district judges or the gap between Democratic-appointed judges and
those appointed by Republicans; nonetheless, I do employ simple
regression analyses to verify temporal patterns.
As previous noted, the Carp-Manning dataset is based on federal
court decisions published in the Federal Supplement. Carp and
Manning generously provided me with the most recent version of the
dataset that includes cases decided as late as 2016. Specifically, the
dataset I employ includes cases from as late as 2014, going through
page 1358 of volume 30, series 3 of the Federal Supplement, plus a
scattering of later volumes.204 I limit my analysis to the 116,953 cases
decided between 1934 and 2014.205 Because the dataset is based on
what was included in specific volumes of the Federal Supplement, the
dataset does not include all relevant cases decided prior to 2014 that
will eventually appear in the Federal Supplement. Another difference
in the dataset I used compared to that used by Sennewald et al. is that
social security cases had been added. 206 One final difference is that I
had a research assistant recode a small subset of cases that had been
coded early in the development of the dataset using a category that
was later replaced by two separate categories.
Figure 18 shows the number of decisions each year separately for
Republican and Democratic appointees. For 1934 through 1940 the
dataset includes between 100 and 200 decisions a year combining
appointees of both parties; between 1941 and 1950, there were
between 270 and 380 cases per year, and through most of the 1950s,
the number was in the 300s. The annual number of cases first exceeded
1,000 per year in 1967 and over the last two decades there have
generally been between 2000 and 3,600 cases per year. For the
analyses, I computed the percentage of decisions decided in a liberal
direction separately for Democratic-appointed judges and for
Republican-appointed judges each on an annual, biennial, or
quadrennial basis, depending on whether I had partitioned by issue
area, and if partitioned, how finely.
204

The overall dataset also includes cases from a scattering of volumes after the
30th. I omitted those 549 cases from the dataset I analyzed.
205
I dropped 149 cases decided prior to 1934 and 488 decided after 2014.
206
In social security cases, decisions favoring the claimant are coded as liberal.
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Figure 18: Number of Decisions by Year and Party of Appointing
President
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1. Judge’s Party or Appointing President’s Party?
In the analyses of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, I
focused on the party of the appointing President. Sennewald, et al.’s
primary analysis employed the party of the judge. That required them
to omit decisions by judges who could not be identified with a party.
Here I show why it is probably best to rely on the appointing
president’s party, rather than the judge’s party, even though the party
background of most federal judges aligns with the party of the
president who appointed them. Figure 19 plots the biennial percent
liberal by judge’s party for the 6,976 decisions (6.05 percent of all
decisions in the dataset) by judges appointed by a President of the
opposite party; I used biennial percentages because of the relatively
small number of cross-party appointments. As the figure shows,
decisions by judges with Republican backgrounds appointed by
Democratic presidents have tended to be more likely to be in a liberal
direction than are decisions by judges with Democratic backgrounds
who were appointed by Republican presidents. That is, it appears that
the party of the appointing president tends to trump any prior party
background of the appointee, although this may have shifted over the
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last 10 years covered by the data.207 Because less than 10 percent of
cases in the dataset were decided by judges who either had partisan
affiliations opposite to that of the appointing president or for whom it
was not possible to identify a partisan affiliation, 208 there is little
difference in the patterns I show using party of the appointing
president compared to what would be seen using party of the judge.
Figure 19: Liberal Percent by Party of the Judge, Cross-Party
Appointees Only
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Dashed line fitted using lowess procedure
(by two-year periods, n≥20)

2. Overall Pattern: A Growing Gap
Figure 20 shows the annual percent liberal for all cases by the
party of the appointing president, in red for Republican-appointed

207

My finding is consistent with a study of interparty judicial appointments that
used length of sentences imposed by federal district judges in New York as an
indicator of behavior. The author of that study concluded that “a lower federal
judge’s ideology is in large part a function solely of the nominating president’s
ideology”; see Jonathan Remy Nash, Interparty Judicial Appointments, 12 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 664, 664–65 (2015).
208
The data set includes 3,974 (3.4 percent of all decisions) by judges for whom no
information could be found regarding the judge’s own party affiliation.
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judges and blue for Democratic-appointed judges. 209 It also shows the
gap between the two groups of judges, plotted in black and scaled
according to the right-side axis; the horizontal line across the middle
of the figure represents no gap. As the figure shows, there was a
narrow and highly variable gap up until 1970; there were even a few
occasional years when the appointees of Republicans had a slightly
higher percentage of liberal decisions than did the appointees of
Democrats. Starting around 1970 the gap widens, although the
percentage of liberal decisions tends to decline for both groups of
judges starting in the mid-1990s. The lowess lines shown in the figure
indicate an apparent long-term pattern of decreasing liberalism for
appointees of Republican presidents. This is confirmed by simple
linear regressions using year to predict the annual percent liberal. 210
For appointees of Republican presidents, the percent liberal declines
by three-quarters of a percentage point each decade.211 In contrast,
appointees of Democratic presidents show periods of increasing
liberalism and periods of decreasing liberalism; there is no linear
relationship for Democratic-appointed judges. 212

209

The gap between Democratic and Republican appointees increases markedly in
the mid-1960s. See also Sennewald et al., supra note 193, at 660 fig.1.
210
I reemphasize that I am not in any sense seeking to fully model the trend, but
rather to simply test whether there are secular trends in the patterns for the two sets
of judges.
211
Regression results: b=-.076, t=-3.67, r2=.146, two-tailed p<.001.
212
Regression results: b=.017, t=.71, r2=.006, two-tailed p=.481.
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Figure 20: Liberal Percent by Party of the Appointing President
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Based on this analysis, there was an increased gap between
appointees of Democrats and appointees of Republicans in their
overall decision patterns, at least as measured by published decisions
starting in the mid-1950s and continuing into the 1990s. However,
over the last 20 years shown in Figure 20, the gap moderated
somewhat. This moderation reflected both a decrease in the liberal
pattern for appointees of Democrats over the last 20 years shown and
an increase in the liberal pattern for appointees of Republicans over
the last 10 years shown. Moreover, although the gap is measurable, it
is not huge, only 9 percentage points for the 2004-2014 period, 213
about the same magnitude found for the Court of Appeals. 214
C. Can the Changes Be Explained by Realignment in the States of
the South?
One possible explanation for some of the shifts appearing in
Figure 20, particularly for Democratic-appointed judges, is the change
in the southern states from one-party Democratic to one-party
Republican. This might account for the period of increasing liberalism
213

The two averages for the period are 46.6 and 37.6; a matched pairs t-test is
statistically significant (t=13.09, p<.001).
214
See infra Part IV.
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of Democratic-appointed judges as the very conservative southern
Democratic judges retired or died.215 To test this, I replicated Figure
20 omitting judges from the 11 states of the Confederacy. There are
some differences between Figure 20 and Figure 21 that are worth
noting. First, the liberalism of Democratic-appointed judges does not
show the dip during the 1950s as it did when the Democraticappointed southern judges were included. Second, the moderation of
the gap over the final 20 years that could be seen in Figure 20 is less
evident in Figure 21. Even with the differences, clearly the broad
patterns cannot be explained by regional differences.
Figure 21: Liberal Percent by Party of the Appointing President
Omitting Judges from the Southern States of the Confederacy
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215
I do not want to over generalize here. There were certainly some extremely
conservative Democrats, such as Harold Cox of Mississippi. See Carol Caldwell,
Harold Cox: Still Racist After All These Years, AM. LAW. July 1979, at 1, 27–29.
However, there were also many brave southern judges, particularly when it came
to efforts to desegregate schools. See generally J.W. PELTASON, 58 LONELY MEN:
SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961).
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D. Do the Shifts Reflect Changes in the Types of Cases Being
Decided?
As was true for the other two levels of courts, the nature of cases
resulting in published decisions by federal district judges has changed
substantially over the 80 years covered by the District Court database.
Some specific types of cases have disappeared entirely, and new kinds
of cases have appeared. I grouped most decisions into the same three
broad categories: civil liberties, criminal, and economics/regulation
used for the other court levels.216 Figure 22 shows the changing
distribution of decisions among the three broad categories over the
period of my analysis.
Figure 22: The Changing Agenda in Published Decisions U.S.
District Court Judges
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216

Three of the specific categories, comprising 6.3 percent of all decisions in the
dataset, did not fit into one of the three broad categories: social security appeals
(4,243 cases), immigration (3,049 cases), and military exclusion (26 cases).
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Economics and regulation have declined as a share of the
published federal district court decisions, with a much larger share
involving civil rights and civil liberties. The share comprised by
criminal cases increased in the 1950s and 1960s but then decreased
sharply starting around 1970.217 Moreover, as shown by Figure 23,
the likelihood of a liberal decision varies depending on the broad
category and the pattern of change in that likelihood varies depending
on the category, increasing since the 1960s (after having slightly
decreased) in criminal cases, but showing the opposite pattern for the
other two categories.
Figure 23: Likelihood of a Liberal Decision by Broad Case
Category: All Judges
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Figures 23 and 24 use biennial data rather than annual data
because there are many years when the number of decisions in one or
more of the three broad categories is very small, more so after splitting
judges by party of the appointing President. Even using biennial data,
217
The decreasing share of criminal cases in the 1970s reflected both increasing
numbers of the other two categories and a sharp drop in the number of published
decisions involving criminal cases. The 1970-71 biennium saw 1,533 criminal
case decisions; the number dropped steadily during the 1970s and bottomed out at
523 during the 1980-81 biennium.
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there are some periods for which the number of decisions available is
very small. Consequently, for the analysis comparing appointees of
the two parties’ presidents, I dropped any observation that was based
on fewer than 20 decisions. The 20-decision-minimum rule required
dropping five observations for appointees of Democrats and seven for
appointees of Republicans out of a total of 246 observations; 218 of the
remaining 234 observations, all but 25 had at least 50 observations.
Table 1: Simple Linear Regressions by Broad Areas of Lawa
Appointees of
Appointees of
Democratic
Republican
Presidents
Presidents
b

se

r2

b

se

r2

Criminal

.230***

.032

.589

.045

.028

.038

Civil Rights &
Civil Liberties

.005

.058

.000

-.131*

.049

.182

Economics,
Regulation, and
Labor &
Employment

-.047

.030

.059

-.066*

.037

.076

a
#

Dependent variable is percent liberal; single predictor is biennium.
p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (all two-tailed)

Figure 24 and Table 1 show separate patterns and statistics for the
three broad areas. For all three, there is a consistent tendency—as
shown by the smoothed, lowess lines—for appointees of Democratic
presidents to be more likely to make a liberal decision than appointees
of Republican presidents. However, the pattern of change differs for
the three broad areas:
 In criminal cases, appointees of presidents of both parties
tended to become more liberal, although the trend is much
stronger for appointees of Democrats. Only for the
Democratic-appointed judges is the trend statistically
significant.
218

Five of the dropped observations were from the 1930s; there were two each for
the late 1940s and early 1950s.
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In civil rights and civil liberties cases during the 1970s, the two
groups of judges diverged with appointees of Democrats
becoming more liberal and appointees of Republicans
becoming more conservative. Appointees of Republicans
continued their movement in the conservative direction over
the past two decades. However, appointees of Democrats
reversed course and moved in a conservative direction starting
in the mid-1980s. Over the entire period, appointees of
Republicans became more conservative while appointees of
Democrats had little net change. The trend for the Republicanappointed judges is statistically significant.
In
cases
involving
economics,
regulation,
and
labor/employment, both groups of judges moved modestly in
a conservative direction with appointees of Republicans
starting that shift in the mid-1960s and appointees of
Democrats not until around 1980.The trend is statistically
significant for Republican-appointed judges but not for
Democratic-appointed judges.219

The trend for Democratic-appointed justices is not that different, but it is
sufficiently weaker so as not to meet the conventional standard for statistical
significance.
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Figure 24: Liberal Percent by Party of Appointing President for
Three Broad Areas of Law
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As shown by the regression analyses reported in Table 1, the
increase in liberal decisions among appointees of Democratic
presidents in criminal cases offsets the conservative shift in
economics, regulation, and labor/employment cases, resulting in an
overall pattern of no trend. Among appointees of Republicans, two of
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the three broad areas had patterns of increasing likelihood of
conservative decisions while the other area manifested no trend; this
produced the overall pattern of increasing conservatism by appointees
of Republicans.
Figure 25 shows the percent liberal by presidential cohort.
Interestingly, there is little difference among the appointees of Reagan
and the two Bushes, the last three Republican presidents whose
appointees appear in the dataset served between 1981 and 2009, nor is
there a lot of difference among the cohorts of the five Republican
presidents prior to Reagan. There is much more variation among the
cohorts of the Democratic presidents,220 and this explains the lack of
any consistent over-time pattern for appointees of Democrats that was
shown in Figure 22.
Figure 25: Liberalism in District Court Decisions by Presidential
Cohort
50

45

40

35

30

25
Wils Hard Cool Hoov FDR HST

Ike

JFK

Appointees of Democrats

220

LBJ Nixon Ford Carter Reag Bsh1 Clnt Bush2Obam

Appointees of Republicans

This variation cannot be explained as a result of Democratic presidents prior to
Johnson appointing conservative southern Democrats; rerunning Figure 24
omitting the eleven states of the Confederacy has minimal effect on the pattern
shown in Figure 24.
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E. Summary: Federal District Courts
Regarding published decisions by judges of the federal district
courts, the analysis shows an overall pattern of an increasing
difference in the likelihood of a liberal decision by appointees of
Democrats compared to appointees of Republicans. However, the gap
leveled off by the late 1990s and has perhaps even narrowed. This may
be due to the likelihood of a conservative decision by appointees of
the last three Republican presidents included in the dataset (Reagan
and the two Bushes) being constant, while the liberalism of appointees
of the intervening Democratic president, Bill Clinton, was
substantially below that of Presidents Johnson, Carter, and Obama.
The analysis of the three broad issue areas suggests that any narrowing
of the gap in recent years came largely in civil rights and civil liberties
cases. However, even after taking all this into account, the gap is on
the order of 10 percentage points, essentially the same as what the
analysis showed for the Court of Appeals for the most recent period
that data were available for that court.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Decision making by justices of the Supreme Court has become
increasingly polarized. The fact that a significant percentage of
decisions are unanimous tends to dampen the gap between appointees
of Democrats and appointees of Republicans. However, focusing on
the decisions in nonunanimous cases, the gap has widened sharply
during the Roberts Court to the point that the average for the first six
natural courts (through the 2017 term) under Roberts has been 35.5,
compared to 17.0 for the six natural courts during Rehnquist’s
tenure.221 Even these figures understate the degree of polarization
because the gap has actually declined in nonunanimous
economics/regulatory cases, averaging 5.1 percentage points during
Roberts’s tenure compared to 14.0 during Rehnquists’. In contrast, the
average gaps under Roberts for criminal and for civil rights/civil
liberties have been 46.8 and 49.7 percentage points compared to 15.3
and 16.8 under Rehnquist.
The analysis also shows a growing gap for the Court of Appeals.
That gap is much less pronounced as one would expect, given that the
221

The average for the seven natural courts during Burger’s tenue was 22.4. The
average gap for the 11 natural courts during Warren’s tenure was 6.4.
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Court of Appeals must decide all cases presented to it that are not
withdrawn by the parties. However, in contrast to the Supreme Court,
the gap has grown to about the same level for each of the three broad
issue areas, on the order of 10 percentage points. The analysis also
showed that, starting with President Nixon and continuing at least
through the first President Bush, Republican presidents made
increasingly conservative appointments; the lack of data after 2002
precludes drawing any conclusions about whether the second
President Bush continued this trend. In contrast, there was relatively
little variation in the liberal decision patterns of appointees of
Democratic presidents over the last half century included in the dataset
(i.e., Truman through Clinton).
Kastellac’s analysis of the impact of panel composition suggests
that the figure above may, in some sense, understate polarization on
the Court of Appeals. He found that the gap between panels composed
entirely of appointees of Democrats compared to panels composed
entirely of appointees of Republicans had grown to 24 percentage
points. This constituted a quadrupling from for the periods covering
1961 through 1985. An unanswered question regarding the Court of
Appeals is whether the various measures of polarization have
continued to grow since the early 2000s and whether the second
President Bush continued the pattern of Republican presidents
appointing increasingly conservative judges to the Court of Appeals.
Regarding published decisions by judges of the federal district
courts, my analysis shows that the gap between Democratic-appointed
judges and Republican-appointed judges increased starting in the
1960s to the point that it is, for the most recent years examined, on the
order of 10 percentage points. Thus, the gaps for the two lower federal
courts, are on the same order, and considerably smaller than for the
Supreme Court. However, given that the data for the Court of Appeals
ends before a significant number of decisions by judges appointed by
either the second Bush or Obama, it may well be that the gap for the
Court of Appeals now exceeds that for the district courts.
Returning to the question that motivated this article: has the
federal judiciary become increasingly polarized in line with what has
happened more generally in American politics? The best answer is
either “yes, but …” or “sort of.” Looking at the gross overall pattern,
there is an increasing divergence between judges appointed by
Democratic presidents versus those appointed by Republican
presidents. That divergence largely reflects change among Republican
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appointees, most likely in who Republican presidents appointed. Even
with some evidence of increasing polarization, the gaps I found in
decisions by lower court judges are much smaller than what exists at
the top of the federal judicial hierarchy. 222 Moreover, the gaps one
finds for the federal courts, at all levels, pales in comparison to the gap
one finds for parallel issues in the U.S. Congress. 223
Thus, although there is evidence showing increasing polarization
in the federal judiciary, the data suggest that federal courts seem to
have not polarized to the same extent that has been seen in other
branches of government. Perhaps, in the end, this is not too surprising.
It is in the trial courts, and to a significant degree on the Court of
Appeals, where one might expect that the legal model of judicial
behavior – that is, the understanding that judges’ decision making is
primarily driven by law, facts, and precedent rather than their own
personal policy preferences – would be most often manifested. This is
evident in the parallel movement over time I describe for the district
courts in the Appendix for many of the detailed subcategories of cases.

222

KECK, supra note 12, at 138–139; SUNSTEIN & EPSTEIN., supra note 11, at 126–
128.
223
KECK, supra note 12, at 147.
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APPENDIX A
Analysis Using the “Legacy” Supreme Court Database
As discussed previously, the “Legacy” version of the SCDB
extends back to 1791, with cases defined by citation. For the analysis
presented here, I started with the 1933 term of the Court. I begin with
the 1933 term because the resulting analysis closely parallels the
periods examined for the Court of Appeals and the district courts.
Also, by 1933, the Supreme Court is well into the period when it has
substantial control over its docket under the terms of the Judiciary Act
of 1925, commonly called the Judges’ Bill.224 For the 1933 through
2017 terms, this version of the SCDB contains about 10,100 cases,
with over 98,000 votes by individual justices. 225 Omitting the votes
that could not be coded liberal or conservative leaves 91,440 votes for
analysis.
One of the problems with using the “Modern” version of the
SCDB is that all justices who served on the Vinson Court were
appointed by Democrats. Extending the analysis back to 1933, thus
adding the last years of the Hughes Court and the entire Stone Court
period, provides a mix of Democratic-appointed and Republicanappointed justices prior to the Warren Court. Figure A1 is modeled on
Figure 5. Using the citation-based unit, it differs little from Figure 5
starting with the Warren Court, but it also extends back to include
some years of the Hughes Court. It makes clear that the gap between
Democratic-appointed justices and Republican-appointed justices was
modest until sometime into the Warren Court. The smoothed line
shows a gap for all cases that was generally less than five percentage

224

See Judges’ Bill, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/judgesbill [https://perma.cc/5HMZ-GTD5]. See also Jonathan Sternberg, Deciding Not to
Decide: The Judiciary Act of 1925 and the Discretionary Court, 33 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 1 (2008) (providing a general history of the adoption of the Judges’ Bill).
Also, Devins and Baum report that their examination of the years prior to 1937
revealed little in the way of partisan polarization on the Court. Devins & Baum,
Split Definitive, supra note 10, at 310.
225
The actual “Legacy” version of the SCDB covers the terms from 1791 through
1945. The “Modern” version, in its three formats, covers 1946 through 2017. For
my analysis I merged the “Legacy” version with the citation-based version of the
“New” version. For simplicity, refer to this merged, citation-based dataset as the
“Legacy” version of the SCDB.
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points, and on the order of ten percentage points when the analysis is
limited to nonunanimous cases.

Percent Liberal

Percent Liberal

Figure A1: Liberalism by Party of Appointing President and
Natural Court, 1933-2017 Terms

376

K AN . J.L. & P UB . P OL ’ Y

Vol. XXVIII

Figure A2 shows the ideological voting pattern for each
presidential cohort. It makes clear that prior to Lyndon Johns, the
differences among presidential cohorts was not that sharp. Moreover,
there was no consistent pattern of greater tendency of liberalism
depending on the president’s party. Kennedy’s cohort is just barely on
the liberal side, but that reflects his liberal appointee, Arthur Goldberg,
who served on the Court for only three years before Lyndon Johnson
convinced him to accept appointment as the U.S. ambassador to the
United Nations; in contrast, Kennedy’s moderate to conservative
appointee, Byron White, served on the Court for 31 years. The only
liberal cohort by a Republican president after 1960 was Ford’s, and
his cohort consisted of a single Justice, John Paul Stevens.
Figure A2: Liberalism by Presidential Cohort, 1933-2017 Terms
80
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Figure A3 replicates Figure 7, extending back to the 1933 term
and using citation rather than issue as the unit of analysis. There is no
appreciable difference in what the figure shows for the Vinson Court
forward compared to Figure 7. Figure A3 does make it clear the even
greater dominance of economic and regulatory cases prior to the
Vinson Court, and, with the exception of one natural court under Chief
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Justice Hughes, the particularly small share of the docket composed
of criminal cases.
Figure A3: Supreme Court Agenda Pattern, 1933 to 2017 Terms,
by Natural Court
100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
Hughes
Court

Stone Vinson
Court Court

Criminal

Warren
Court

Burger
Court

Civil Rights/Liberties

Rehnquist
Court

Roberts
Court

Economics/Regulation

Figure A4 extends Figure 8 back to the 1933 term. Looking at the
subgraphs for Criminal cases and for Civil Rights & Liberties cases
for all cases (i.e., including unanimous cases), the smoothed line for
Democratic-appointed justices is indistinguishable from that for
Republican-appointed justices prior to the Warren Court. The gap for
the smoothed lines for Economic/Regulations cases is small, about
five percentage points. Looking at the subgraphs restricted to
nonunanimous cases, there is little or no difference for criminal cases
until the Warren Court; recall that there were no decisions by
Republican-appointed justices during the Vinson Court because all
justices on that Court had been appointed by either Roosevelt or
Truman. For Civil Rights & Liberties cases, the Republican-appointed
Justices were more likely to vote liberal than were the Democraticappointed Justices, both of whom, McReynolds and Brandeis, were
appointed by Woodrow Wilson; the conservative tint of Wilson’s
appointees is due to McReynolds, who cast conservative votes in 23
of the 30 nonunanimous Civil Rights & Liberties cases he participated
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in.226 For Economics/Regulation cases, the gap for nonunanimous
cases increases during the Warren and Burger Courts, but then starts
to converge so that there is little difference by the most recent period
of the Roberts Court.
Figure A4: Liberal Voting by Natural Court and Legal Area, 1933
to 2017 Terms

226

Woodrow Wilson himself was conservative when it came to civil rights
questions. See RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO: FROM
RUTHERFORD B. HAYES TO WOODROW WILSON 361–63 (1965).
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Figure A4: Continued
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Figure A5 shows the liberal voting percentage for each
presidential cohort separately by legal area, both for all cases and
limited to nonunanimous cases. It is clear from these two figures that
the divergence between Democratic-appointed justices and
Republican-appointed justices really starts with Johnson’s
appointments, particularly if one discounts the one-justice (Stevens)
Ford cohort. The cohorts prior to Johnson’s do not consistently align
as liberal, if Democratic-appointed, or conservative, if Republicanappointed. Two of the pre-Johnson Democratic-appointed cohorts are
more conservative in criminal cases than any of the Republicanappointed cohorts pre-Johnson.
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Percent Liberal

Figure A5: Liberal Voting by Presidential Cohort and Legal Area,
1933-2017 Terms
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APPENDIX B
Federal District Court Decisions by Detailed Case Categories
In this appendix, I report patterns of change in decisions by federal
district judges using detailed case categories. This is possible due to
the presence of over 115,000 cases in the dataset. Table B1 shows the
number of cases in each category both in total and for time intervals.
Not surprisingly, on an annual basis or even a biennial basis, there
were many years with fewer than 20 observations for a specific-issuecategory/appointing-party combination.227 Consequently, I used fouryear intervals. Even using four-year intervals, slightly more than a
quarter (213 of 836) of observations failed to meet my 20-decision
minimum; 177 of these dropped observations were for periods prior to
1970. Of the remaining 623 observations, 454 (72.9 percent) were
based on at least 50 decisions.
Table B1: Numbers of Observations by Detailed Category over
Time
PERIOD
NATURE OF CASE

Criminal
Habeas Corpus-US
Habeas Corpus-State
Criminal Court
Motion
Contempt of Court
NonconvictionCriminal Case
Sentencing
Guidelines
227

195473

197493

19942014

402

1,038

728

884

3,052

221

2,886

2,521

3,169

8,797

507

3,115

4,715

8,176

16,513

14

38

0

1

53

163

396

620

629

1,808

0

0

0

971

971

193453

Total

Some of the specific categories, such as sentencing guidelines and rent control
plus many of the specific types of discrimination claims, did not exist for the entire
period.
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Civil Rights/Civil Liberties
Native American
71
Rights
Voting Rights
23
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100

278

425

874

209

440

504

1,176

80

964

2,106

2,531

5,681

31

1,579

5,876

11,799

19,285

165

781

1,305

1,972

4,223

Freedom of Religion

70

456

475

725

1,726

Women’s Rights

0

35

1,402

2,210

3,647

Handicapped Rights

2

0

484

3,640

4,126

Reverse
Discrimination-Race

0

0

82

144

226

Reverse
Discrimination-Sex

0

0

22

29

51

Right to Privacy
Age Discrimination

0
0

0
0

260
532

799
1,300

1,059
1,832

Economics & Regulation
Union v. Company
182

921

1,403

944

3,450

Member v. Union

15

287

612

321

1,235

Employee v.
Employer

695

534

3,234

6,298

10,761

Commercial
Regulation

762

1,473

2,410

2,145

6,790

Environmental
Regulation

136

372

1,408

2,152

4,068

Local/State
Economic

151

377

1,460

1,850

3,838

Racial
Discrimination
14th Amendment
Freedom of
Expression
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Labor Dispute-Govt
v. Union or
Employer

53

13

1

0

67

Rent Control, Excess

682

139

121

25

967

NLRB v. Employer

301

443

560

1,155

2,459

NLRB v. Union

56

320

202

97

675

0

971

1,709

1,563

4,243

13
688

1
738

2
432

10
1,208

26
3,066

35,400

57,884

116,953

Other
Social Security
Appeal
Military Exclusion
Immigration
TOTAL

5,483 18,186

Criminal
The detailed coding includes six specific areas related to criminal
cases. However, one of those, contempt of court, has only 56
observations. A second area, sentencing guidelines, has only existed
since the mid-1980s, making it impractical to try to map long-term
changes. Using four-year periods and the 20-decision minimum, the
number of data points for a category varied from as few as 14 to as
many as 20. Figure B1 and Table B2 show the results for the four
remaining subsets of criminal cases. For clarity, given the small size
of individual plots in Figures B1 through B3, I have omitted the lines
representing the size of the gaps.
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Percent Liberal

Figure B1: Specific Criminal Areas

In federal habeas corpus cases, the movement for Democratic
appointees was in a liberal direction and the trend was marginally
statistically significant; there was no clear pattern for Republican
appointees. In contrast, there were clear differences between the two
groups of appointees in state habeas corpus cases in the years since
about 1970. Prior to that time, there was little difference between
appointees of the two parties, with both moving in a liberal direction.
Starting in the 1970s, there was a growing gap with appointees of
Democrats moving in a liberal direction and appointees of
Republicans moving slightly in a conservative direction. The decline
for Republicans does not show in the simple regression results in
Table B2 because the initial movement in the liberal direction
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dominates that result and the overall pattern is nonlinear. 228 It is
somewhat surprising that appointees of Democrats moved so sharply
in a liberal direction given the constraints on review of state habeas
corpus petitions created by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. Based on the AEDPA, the Supreme
Court “has decided a long series of cases interpreting [the act’s] limits
on the power of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus when
state prisoners challenge their convictions.” 229
Table B2: Simple Linear Regressions for Criminal Law
Categoriesa
Appointees of
Democratic
Presidents
b

se

Appointees of
Republican
Presidents
r2

b

se

r2

Habeas Corpus
– Federal

.165#

.095

.160

.037

.091

.010

Habeas Corpus
– State

.398***

.051

.791

.123

.072

.173

Criminal Court
Motion

.173**

.065

.281

.112*

.045

.257

Bench
Conviction or
Forfeiture

-.065

.133

.014

-.259*

.101

.353

a

Dependent variable is percent liberal; single predictor is biennium.
Four-year intervals; number of observations varies between 14 and
20.
#
p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
In cases involving bench trials or decisions on property forfeitures
in criminal cases, appointees of Republican presidents moved in a
228

This nonlinearity can be captured by adding a quadratic term to the regression.
See BLALOCK, supra note 25, at 326–327. Doing so increased the R2 to .524, and
both the linear and quadratic terms are statistically significant (p<.01 for both).
229
LAWRENCE BAUM, IDEOLOGY IN THE SUPREME COURT 87 (2017).
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consistently conservative direction and the pattern is statistically
significant. Appointees of Democrats moved in a similar direction
starting in about 1990, although the overall trend is not statistically
significant probably because prior to 1990, these judges had a slight
tendency in the more liberal direction.230 Both groups moved in a
liberal direction in decisions regarding other kinds of criminal court
motions; the gap between the groups was fairly constant over the entire
period.
The similarity of movement for Democratic and Republican
appointees in two of the subcategories of criminal matters raises the
question of whether that similarity was coincidental or reflected trial
court judges responding to statutory changes and Supreme Court
decisions. Trial judges are usually constrained when applying
relatively clear law, whether it be statutory or case law. Moreover,
when the law is clear, one would expect to see similarity in lower court
decision patterns overtime. However, there are some patterns that
seem to run against the constraining influence of statutes and/or the
Supreme Court. Specifically, why did appointees of Democrats
continue to move in a liberal direction in state habeas corpus cases
after the passage of the AEDPA in 1996? Figure B1 does show a
conservative shift around the time the act was passed, but the
movement in a liberal direction resumed almost immediately.
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Figure B2 and Table B3 show the patterns for eight categories of
civil rights and civil liberties cases. I combined three separate
discrimination
categories—age
discrimination,
disability
discrimination, and Native American rights—into a single “other
discrimination” category. Even after collapsing the data into four-year
periods, there was only one observation for appointees of Republicans
prior to the four-year period 1956-59. 231 Consequently, although there
were more observations for appointees of Democrats prior to the 195659 period, I limited the analysis to decisions starting with that
period.232 Although this leaves a maximum of 15 observations for
230
Adding a quadratic term to capture the shift in the direction of movement does
not, for this set of decisions, produce statistically significant results.
231
There was total of eight, 1 for 1940–43, 1 for 1944–47, 2 for 1948–51, and 4 for
1952–53.
232
The one earlier observation meeting the 20-or-more criterion for appointees of
Republicans was freedom of expression for the period 1940-1943.
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each party’s appointees for a specific category, 10 of the 120 potential
observations for the periods included in the analysis were completely
missing and another 17 failed to meet the 20-or-more requirement. Not
until the 1984-87 period was there an observation for all eight
categories, and for three of the other four-year periods there were only
one or two data points.
A general observation from Figure B2 is that the pattern in most
of the lowess lines shows, although Democratic appointees were more
likely to make liberal decisions than were Republican appointees over
the last several decades, a pattern of convergence in several categories
in the later years (e.g., racial discrimination and gender
discrimination). Moreover, no category shows a pattern of increasing
divergence. Also, as shown in Table 3, all the statistically significant
trends, regardless of the party of the appointing president, were in a
conservative direction. The broad trend toward more conservative
decisions in the specific areas of civil rights and civil liberties is
consistent with the pattern shown previously in Figure B1.
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Figure B2: Specific Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Categories
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Table B3: Simple Linear Regressions for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties Categoriesa
Appointees of
Democratic
Presidents
b
se
r2

Appointees of
Republican
Presidents
b
se
r2

Freedom of
Expression

.175

.147

.099

.101

.1041

.034

Freedom of
Religion

.041

.250

.002

.016

.194

.001

14th Amendment

.123

.162

.046

-.128#

.067

.251

Voting Rights

.163

.236

.041

-.265*

.090

.490

Racial
Discrimination

-.314#

.148

.257

-.405***

.094

.590

Gender
Discrimination

-.400#

.182

.348

.005

.098

<.001

Other
Discriminationb

-.446**

.130

.566

-.410#

.183

.385

Privacy Rights

-.536

.301

.346

.345

.290

.191

a

Four-year intervals; number of observations varies between 8 and 15.
Includes discrimination based on age, disability, and Native American
status.
#
p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
b

Economic, Regulatory, and Labor & Employment
Figure B3 and Table B4 provide information on the patterns for
eight specific categories dealing with economics, regulation, or labor
and employment.233 The number of data points ranged from 7 to 21.234
233
I omitted one category that included a mix of cases brought by the government
against employers and compensation claims by injured employees under several
compensation plans created under federal law (e.g., FELA and the Jones Act).
234
The maximum number of observations was 21. Five potential observations were
missing entirely; another 44 failed to meet the 20-case minimum.
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As with the other areas, the lowess lines show that appointees of
Democratic presidents tended to be more likely to decide in a liberal
direction comparted to appointees of Republican presidents, although
the gaps for most categories is small. For two categories, commercial
regulation and union vs. company, there was a trend of increasing
liberalism for both groups of judges, while for two other categories,
member vs. union and NLRB vs. employer, decisions of both groups
of judges were increasingly conservative. It would be difficult to argue
that there was a clear pattern of a growing gap for any of the categories
although for one, state or local economic regulation, there was a period
with a sizable gap lasting about 20 years from 1970 to 1990. Here,
even more than for some of the subcategories of criminal and civil
rights/civil liberties, one sees significant parallel movement over time
for the two groups of judges. This is further indication that some of
the movement in decision patterns at the trial level is probably in
response to legal changes that the trial judges must implement.
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Figure B3: Specific Economic, Regulatory, and Labor &
Employment Categories
Commercial Regulation

Environmental Regulation

Rent, Price, or Wage Controls
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Economic Regulation
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Table B4: Simple Linear Regressions for Specific Economics,
Regulation, and Labor & Employment Categories a
Appointees of
Democratic
Presidents
b

se

r2

Appointees of
Republican
Presidents
b

se

r2

Commercial
Regulation

.142***

.036

.454

.191*

.070

.280

Environmental
Regulation

-.136

.084

.169

-.279*

.124

.298

Rent, Price, or
Wage Controls,
or Excess Profits

.043

.119

.026

-.298

.355

.123

State or Local
Economic
Regulation

.178

.169

.073

.234**

.069

.437

Employee v.
Employer

-.022

.034

.024

.056

.075

.032

Union v. Company

. 462***

.054

.819

.335**

.096

.462

Member v. Union

-.687***

.145

.652

-.888**

.209

.668

NLRB v. Employer

-.076

.094

.037

-.089

.101

.045

a

Four-year intervals; number of observations varies between 7 and 21.
p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

#

